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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal realism dominated twentieth century American legal
thought. However, the meaning of the realist movement and the
composition of the movement's membership have been
controversial.! This Article sheds light on the meaning and
1. See generally N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING
FOR AN AmERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 174-75 (1997) [hereinafter HULL, POUND AND
LLEWELLYN] (surveying conflicting definitions of American Legal Realism); Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930)
(promulgating a legal realist manifesto); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About
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nature of the Legal Realist Movement (LRM) by arguing that the
movement consisted of two strains of legal thought-Radical
Legal Realism (RLR) and Conservative Legal Realism (CLR).
Admittedly, the radical strain has been the more recognized and
debated aspect of legal realism.2 This Article will analyze the
mostly neglected strain of CLR. Scholars have not fully
appreciated the political, economic, and religious roots of CLR,
even though some have recognized that there were competing
radical and nonradical schools of realism.' The vehicle for this
investigation of CLR will be the life and works of Nathan Isaacs.4
Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Some Realism] (providing an early defense and definition of legal realism);
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1931)
(critiquing the realist movement). Some commentators have counted all scholars who
attacked aspects of classical legal thought as realists. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 169-70 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ,
TRANSFORMATION]; William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed,
Introduction to AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xiii-xiv (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,
1993). But see JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 7-8, 15-21 (1995) (arguing that the term "Legal Realist" properly describes the
small circle of legal academics lead by Walter Wheeler Cook and Underhill Moore that
were dedicated to empirical legal research and to reforming legal education at Columbia,
Yale, and Johns Hopkins in the 1920s and 1930s).
2. See, e.g., HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 170 ("[The]
Realist[s'] ... most lasting contribution [was a] critique of the claims of orthodox legal
reasoning to be able to provide neutral and apolitical answers to legal questions."); LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 3 (1986) (explaining that the legal realist
movement "grew out of.. . contempt for . .. conceptualistic legal theory.. . . The
realists . . . stressed the uselessness of legal rules and concepts"); Allen R. Kamp,
Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform
Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 327 (1995) ("'Legal Realists,' were a
group of elite academics, from Yale, Harvard, and Columbia ... [who] were generally
modernist, leftist, [and] reform-oriented .... " (footnote omitted)).
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW lxiii (1994) (distinguishing between more extreme realists and
realists who adhered to an "organic theory of rationalism" which acknowledged that legal
reasoning was indeterminate but insisted that legal principles can decide cases); GARY
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END
28-31 (1995) (contrasting "progressive" realists who relied upon social science to provide
the normative content of law and believed that law was more than mere politics with
"radical" realists who were more skeptical about legal reasoning and its purported ability
to separate law and politics); Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law:
Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 201-04
(1998) (adopting Minda's dichotomy); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1225-26 (1985) (distinguishing between realists who believed in
objective social science and those who did not).
4. Isaacs was born in 1886 and died in 1941. Isaacs, Nathan, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 42 (1971). He earned the following degrees at the University of Cincinnati: A.B. in
1907, A.M. in 1909, and a Ph.D. in 1910. The same year he received his Ph.D. he also earned
his LL.B. at the Cincinnati Law School. In 1920, he received his S.J.D. from Harvard Law
School. Myles L. Mace, Nathan Isaacs, 16 BUS. HIST. REV. 19 (1942). Isaacs taught at the
University of Cincinnati from 1912-1918. Isaacs, Nathan, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,
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We will see that Isaacs's thought was complex, multifaceted, and
evolving, but the term CLR best captures his work. This Article
will investigate the legitimacy and determinacy of the legal order
through the lens of CLR as represented by Isaacs.
Isaacs and CLR are especially worthy subjects for study
given the current economic crisis. It is a crisis, much like the
Great Depression, that has spurred many people to question core
capitalistic premises, such as the superiority of minimal
government regulation of business and the structuring of
financial instruments through freedom of contract. Isaacs's
conservative brand of legal realism developed at the time of
America's greatest economic crisis. He represents a strain of
conservative thinking that questions the coherence of existing
rules but is faithful to underlying legal principles. Isaacs was
critical of the rules of private law that existed at the time and
called for a new commercial law. This critique of rules centered
on the divergence of formal rules and rules in fact, along with the
questioning of the public-private distinction and the fallacy of
strict legal formalism. These facets of Isaacs's thinking support
his classification as a legal realist. However, unlike the more
famous legal realists of the 1930s, Isaacs rejected the progressive
political agenda of the New Deal. His merger of antiformalism
and an idealism inspired by the Jewish legal tradition allowed
him to reject Lochner-era judicial decisionmaking while attacking
the constitutionality of New Deal interventionism. His rule
skepticism supported government intervention in the
employment realm, while his belief in the integrity of the
common law system provoked him to respond harshly to the rise
of the administrative state. The thoughts of this nondogmatic
conservative legal thinker and his brand of legal realism are
especially relevant now as the current economic crisis prompts a
rethinking of the legal order.
CLR, although critical of the legal rules of the day, moved
beyond the rule skepticism associated with RLR. It asserts that
supra, at 42. He was assistant dean at the Cincinnati Law School from 1916-1918. Harvard
Law School Library, Nathan Isaacs Papers, 1907-1920: Finding Aid (2003),
httpJ/oasis.ib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/-1aw00033. Isaacs held the 1919-1920 Thayer
teaching fellowship at Harvard Law School; was Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh Law School, 1920-1923; and taught summer session classes at Columbia Law
School during 1921-1923 and 1925-1926. Id. Isaacs was a Professor of Business Law at the
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration from 1924 to 1941, and taught at the
Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration (now the Harvard Kennedy
School) from its founding in 1936 to 1941. Harvard Law School Library, Nathan Isaacs
Papers, 1915-1920: Finding Aid (2007), http/oasis.ib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/-bakOO049
[hereinafter Finding Aid 2007]. He also lectured at Yale Law School between 1937 and 1939.
Isaacs, Nathan, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra, at 42.
[47:2300
BEYOND RULES
although legal rules provide indeterminate answers in hard
cases, principle-guided rules will usually lead to a correct
answer.' CLR calls on judges to strive to uncover underlying
objective principles and to understand their historical evolution.
Isaacs sought to blend an evolving, but cyclical, organic theory of
legal development with the pragmatism needed to make rules
workable. This embrace of both a critical and positive theory of
legal rules, as well as a conservative vision of law, rests on the
recognition that there is often a disconnect between formal and
operative rules. CLR attempts to manage this divergence using
principles, contextual evidence, and operative facts to guide legal
evolution.
CLR provides a historical middle path between strict legal
formalism and radical rule skepticism. Though CLR does not see
rules as a product of pure deduction, rule skepticism is not a
critical endpoint; instead, CLR sees it as the beginning of a
positive-normative process. A historical understanding of the
evolving rules can manage rule indeterminacy. Isaacs's cycle
theory of legal development-the continuous reframing of the
legal order around status-based and contract-based
relationships-asserts that Jewish, common, and civil law
evolved in a similar way. Under cycle theory, the status-based
features of private law take into consideration the social and
economic context that can make a theoretically value-neutral
rule in reality favor certain groups, while contract-based
principles offer a degree of individual choice and freedom.
For Isaacs, a historical understanding of legal principles
should ground the reforming of legal rules. This grounding allows
for a reasoned critique of dynamic rulemaking and for the
diminishment of the contingent nature of law. The contingent
nature of law is contained within a framework of moral, political,
and cultural values. This framework characterizes CLR as both a
critical and positive theory of the legal order. It provides a path
beyond a critique of rules, while at the same time advancing a
conservative, pro-business political agenda. This fusion of an
organic natural law with the inherent indeterminacy of legal
conceptualism moves beyond rules to a principle-based
contextualism. CLR attempts to continuously refresh legal rules
and, at the same time, provide a prescriptive certainty to legal
change based upon historically enriched principles. In some
respects, the Law and Economics (LAE) movement is a recent
example of the conservative strain of legal realism.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 321-24 (explaining Isaacs's display of CLR).
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The initial parts of this Article will set the personal context
of Isaacs's contribution to CLR by providing a brief biographical
sketch and a review of his contributions to American law. Isaacs
was a prolific writer whose books and articles filled legal
scholarship from 1914 through 1941. A review of Isaacs's
background and contributions to disparate areas of law is
necessary in order to understand his view of CLR. Isaacs also
adapted his positions in response to the stormy events of his era,
most notably the Great Depression and World War II.
Nonetheless, his ideas remained remarkably consistent
throughout his academic life. Our approach will discuss Isaacs's
influence on specific areas of doctrine and legal thought, while
also highlighting how and why he adjusted his stances over time.
Isaacs's writings, and his contextual worldview, provide
numerous insights still important to modern legal theory.
Isaacs's early writings provide insights that predated and
presaged the works of the more famous realists, such as Karl
Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Herman Oliphant. It is true that
Llewellyn did not consider Isaacs a core member of the Legal
Realist Movement.6 Moreover, despite his prolific and broad
scholarly production, surprisingly few legal scholars know much
about the man and his place in legal scholarship.! Unfortunately,
the fact that he often disguised his theoretical insights under the
garb of doctrine may have lowered scholars' assessments of many
of his important contributions and their connection to legal
theory. Nonetheless, the works of Nathan Isaacs are cited to this
day in such diverse areas as administrative, constitutional,
contract, trust, and arbitration law. This Article investigates his
many insights across various areas of law and their significance
to modern legal theory.
The Article then shifts to the broader context of the role of
the Jewish legal tradition in shaping Isaacs's critique of
6. Llewellyn did not count Isaacs in the realist camp in either his famous
published list of realists or the longer unpublished list of realists that he sent Dean
Pound, but we will show that Llewellyn was influenced by Isaacs's work. See infra Part
V.D (describing the relationship between Isaacs's work with that of Llewellyn).
7. Peter Linzer had this to say: "Of course, people have been asking these
[important theoretical] questions forever, and I am certainly not denying Lon Fuller's
role, Morris Cohen's role, and somebody who is not as well known as them, Nathan
Isaacs, in his very important but largely forgotten article, The Standardizing of Contracts
in the Yale Law Journal in 1917." Larry Garvin, et al., Theory and Anti-theory in the
Work of Allan Farnsworth, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2006) (emphasis added).
Professor Horwitz includes Isaacs in his group of great minds of the realist movement.
HORwlTZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 183. That group includes Louis Brandeis,
Roscoe Pound, John Dewey, Benjamin Cardozo, Arthur Corbin, Lon Fuller, and Felix
Frankfurter. Id. at 182-84.
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American law. Isaacs's knowledge of the historical development
of the common law and of Jewish law provided a unique scholarly
vantage point that informed his legal realism. The commonality
of Jewish and common law development is a core theme of his
view of American law. This commonality centered Isaacs's
theoretical insights of legal realism and functionalism, as well as
his theories of constitutional interpretation and legal
development. His position in the Harvard Business School also
influenced his view of legal development. Isaacs's writings, while
conscious of history, were also practical in their content. The
framework that allows a conciliation of the many facets of his
scholarship is CLR. CLR allows for the wedding of critical legal
realism to conservative political theory.
As a CLR thinker, Isaacs adopted the legal realists'
skepticism about classical legal theory and stressed a functional
approach to law dictated by the changing needs of society.
However, unlike liberal legal realists who were allies of political
progressivism and liberalism, Isaacs relied upon the legal
realist toolset to attain conservative political, social, and
economic goals. Isaacs's conservatism, which he mediated with
methodological legal realist commitments, took two major
forms. First, Isaacs was a traditionally observant Jew. His
study of Jewish law had a major influence on his secular legal
scholarship, and his knowledge of common and civil law
informed his understanding of Jewish law. An examination of
the influence of Jewish law to his personal development as a
legal scholar is necessary to understand Isaacs's work and
views of law and legal development. We drew our information
about Isaacs's personal approach to life and the role of law
from accounts written by family members,' valuable but
scattered discussions in nonlegal books,' various archival
8. See NANCY ISAACS KLEIN, Seventh Son: A Biography of Moses Legis Isaacs, in
HERITAGE OF FAITH: Two PIONEERS OF JUDAISM IN AMERICA 63 (1987) [hereinafter KLEIN,
Seventh Son] (a niece of Nathan Isaacs recounts family history in a biography of her
father); Elcanan Isaacs, Nathan Isaacs, in MEN OF THE SPIRIT 573, 590 (Leo Jung ed.,
1964) [hereinafter Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT] (invaluable biography of his older
brother Nathan); Raphael Isaacs, Raphael Isaacs, in AMERICAN SPIRITUAL
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES: FIFTEEN SELF-PORTRAITS 83 (Louis Finkelstein ed., 1948) [hereinafter
Raphael Isaacs, SELF-PORTRAITS] (a short spiritual autobiography that casts light on
Nathan's early home life and religious development; written by Raphael Isaacs, a younger
brother of Nathan).
9. See PAUL RITTERBAND & HAROLD S. WECHSLER, JEWISH LEARNING IN AMERICAN
UNIvERSITIES 146-47 (1994) (discussing Isaacs's relationship to Jewish academic
scholarship and attitude to yeshivahs and seminaries); MAx WALLACE, THE AMERICAN
AxIS: HENRY FORD, CHARLES LINDBERGH, AND THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH 131-32
(2003) (discussing covert reports sent to Isaacs by a fellow former military intelligence
agent about the connections between Henry Ford and the Nazis).
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collections,o and previous scholarly discussions of Nathan
Isaacs's life." Second, Isaacs was committed to a vision of
capitalism dominated by the requirements of business. Isaacs
remained a leading figure in the efforts of some legal realists to
adapt the law to the requirements of business while at the same
time strongly opposing the New Deal.
Part II provides a brief biographical sketch of Isaacs's
unique upbringing to better understand his application of the
Jewish legal tradition to American law. His work reflects the
forces that shaped his intellect-Midwestern pragmatism,
business acumen, Jewish Orthodoxy, and intellectual curiosity.
Part III reviews Isaacs's contributions to numerous areas of law
including contract, tort, constitutional, and arbitration law. Part
IV provides the context for assessing Isaacs's works and the
notion of CLR. This Part investigates the role of Jewish law in
the framing of Isaacs's CLR, the place of CLR in the LRM and
modern legal theory, and the merging of the Jewish legal
tradition and legal realism into a unified theory of legal
development (cycle theory). Part V further explores the
relationship between Isaacs's form of realism with Jewish law
and the LRM. It more specifically analyzes his functional
approach to the underlying themes of legal realism including
interdisciplinary study of law, Llewellynian thought, and
Hohfeldian conceptualism. Part VI and Part VII examine two
important themes in Isaacs's CLR-the unconstitutionality of
New Deal legislation and his theory of legal reasoning.
Ultimately, two principles underlie Isaacs's functionalism:
(1) law is a hybrid of status-based and contract-based
10. See Nathan Isaacs Papers, American Jewish Historical Society, Newton
Centre, Mass. and New York, N.Y.; Nathan Isaacs Papers, Hebrew College, Newton
Centre, Mass.; Nathan Isaacs Papers, 1915-1941, Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field, Boston, Mass. (5 Boxes and 2 Volumes);
Nathan Isaacs Papers, microfilm reel entitled "Letters to Professor Isaacs, concerning
numerous subjects of interest to him, 1910-1945," MS-184, The Jacob Rader Marcus
Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio; Adolph S. Oko Papers, MS-
14, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio
(9 boxes); The Class Notes of Nathan Isaacs, 1919-1920, Harvard Depository Class
Notes Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass. (1 box); Nathan
Isaacs Papers, 1907-1920, Harvard Depository Modern Manuscript Collection,
Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass. (1 box). Unless otherwise noted, all
references to documents on file with an archive refer to the Nathan Isaacs Papers of
the institution.
11. See Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and
Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777, 789 [hereinafter Weisbrod, Way We Live]
(discussing how some of Isaacs's intellectual contributions apply to modern family law);
Roy Tannenbaum, Jew and Professor: The Life and Personality of Nathan Isaacs as
Reflected in His Papers in the American Jewish Archives (1967) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with American Jewish Historical Society).
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relationships and (2) the need for a principle-based, rational-
realistic approach to legal reasoning.
II. SETTING THE CONTEXT:
A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH12
Isaacs was an orthodox observer of Jewish law and a
believer in the Jewish faith. An intimate friend judged that his
faith was based upon personal conviction and not merely "a creed
which he inherited."" However, Isaacs's upbringing in a unique
nineteenth-century midwestern family that held fast to Jewish
Orthodoxy immensely influenced him. Before arriving in
America, the Isaacs family lived in the town of Libawa, which
was located in the borderland between Lithuania and Germany.14
Isaacs's paternal grandfather, Schachne Isaacs, was "known as a
'fire-eater,' eternally vigilant in the observance of orthodoxy and
against any innovation." In 1853, Schachne immigrated to
Cincinnati, Ohio." Cincinnati was the home of Rabbi Isaac M.
Wise, the father of the American Jewish Reform movement,
which Schachne fervently opposed." When Schachne was
presented with Wise's radically reformed prayer book, he publicly
12. The biographical information in the following passages, except otherwise noted,
is based upon the following sources: Isaacs, Nathan, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra
note 4, at 42; Mace, supra note 4, at 19-20; Interview with Paul Wotitzky, Son-in-Law of
Nathan Isaacs, in Brookline, Mass. (Feb. 13, 2008 and May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Wotitzky
Interview] (notes on file with Authors); see also Finding Aid 2007, supra note 4 (describing
the location of various sources).
13. Adolph S. Oko, Memorial Address for Nathan Isaacs 1 (Feb. 22, 1942) (on file
with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio,
Oko Papers, Box 9, File 12) [hereinafter Oko, Memorial Address]. Oko (1883-1944),
affiliated for many years with the Reform movement's Hebrew Union College in
Cincinnati, was a prominent librarian and a scholar who greatly influenced Isaacs. See
An Inventory to the Adolph S. Oko Papers, Manuscript Collection No. 14, 1911-1944,
http://www.americanjewisharchives.org/aja/FindingAids/oko.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2010) (chronicling Oko's life and achievements); see also Letter from Nathan Isaacs to
Adolph S. Oko (July 10, 1936) [hereinafter, Isaacs to Oko Letter, July 10, 1936] (on file
with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko
Papers, Box 8, File 3) (acknowledging Oko's great intellectual influence on Isaacs). Isaacs
was committed to a ritually observant lifestyle while Oko identified as a Reform Jew.
However, they shared a common commitment to the renewal of Jewish learning and life.
See Memorandum from Nathan Isaacs to Chancellor Henry Hurwitz (June 24, 1917)
[hereinafter Isaacs Memorandum, June 24, 1917] (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus
Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 2)
(regarding that goal, Oko and Isaacs found themselves "surprisingly in accord for two
Jews who according to all the formal classifications of Jews current to-day would be put
on different sides of the fence").
14. Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 575.
15. Id. at 575-76.
16. Id.
17. JACOB RADER MARCUS, II UNITED STATES JEWRY 1776-1885, at 57-60 (1993).
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burned the prayer book in a stove and excommunicated Wise."8
Isaacs's maternal grandfather, Aaron Tzevi Friedman,
immigrated to America in 1848 and became a prominent ritual
slaughterer in New York City.'9 Friedman's daughter Rachel and
Schachne Isaacs's son Abraham married; they had eleven
children, including Nathan Isaacs.20
The Isaacs family was highly respected for their
accomplishments, character, and loyalty to traditional Judaism.2 '
Their retention of a punctilious religious observance after three
generations in America was particularly remarkable.22 The Isaacs
household valued intellectual accomplishments more than
material success. Nathan's brother Raphael attested that in their
family "scholarship was considered the highest aim in a
successful life" because proper knowledge of the Torah (the
"Law") required unending study of a comprehensive religious law
that related to most areas of life.23 The Isaacs children did not
feel oppressed by the burdens of ritual because they experienced
it as a natural part of life.24 At the same time, their parents
rarely discussed dogma, as opposed to religious law. The Isaacs
children felt they had "a considerable amount of freedom in the
application of the religious laws to changing conditions."25 After
18. I. HAROLD SHARFMAN, THE FIRST RABBI: ORIGINS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN
ORTHODOX & REFORM: JEWISH POLEMIC WARFARE IN PRE-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 425-26
(1988); Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 576.
19. KLEIN, Seventh Son, supra note 8, at 69-70. Friedman was "widely known as
the 'Ba'al Shem' [Holy Man] of America." Cyrus Adler, Friedman, Aaron Zebi, in
JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=
409&letter=F&search=Friedman (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
20. Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 576-77.
21. "Cincinnati Jewry looked up to the Isaacs as to courageous men standing on a
summit unattainable to all others." BORIS D. BOGEN, BORN A JEW 73 (1930) (in
collaboration with Alfred Segal). Boris D. Bogen (1869-1929), a pioneering Russian-born
Jewish social worker, became the Superintendent of United Jewish Charities of
Cincinnati in 1904. See An Inventory to the Boris Bogen Papers, Manuscript Collection
No. 3, 1891-1929, http://www.americanjewisharchives.org/aja/FindingAids/Bogen.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
22. Elcanan Isaacs attributed Nathan Isaacs's loyalty to Judaism in part to a
"stimulating early education in Jewish subjects." Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra
note 8, at 592.
23. Raphael Isaacs, SELF-PORTRAITS, supra note 8, at 86. Nathan, who was six
years older than Raphael, was Raphael's teacher. See id. at 86-87.
24. "There was no punishment or criticism for a violation of religious law," Raphael
recalled, "it just was not the thing to do, so it never occurred to [the children] to violate it."
Raphael Isaacs, SELF-PORTRAITS, supra note 8, at 85.
25. Id. at 87. The Isaacs clan did not always feel bound by community practices. In
keeping with his minimalist Lithuanian-Jewish heritage, Abraham Isaacs detested
longwinded performances by Cantors that sacrificed the meaning of the Hebrew words of
the prayers in favor of catchy tunes. Accordingly, Abraham and his nine sons bucked
Cincinnati Orthodox convention by walking out of the synagogue at 11:00 a.m. every
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an immersion in Jewish learning and heritage from childhood,
Isaacs's lifelong study of Jewish law reinforced his allegiance to
the Jewish religion and his belief in its ability to respond to
modern times.26 As an adult, he sought to discover intellectual
justifications for Jewish ritual observance. Influenced by his
secular studies, Isaacs's understanding of his religion eventually
became significantly different from his childhood training. 7
Despite his development of a more pragmatic view of Judaism, he
remained religiously observant even after achieving professional
28success.
Isaacs excelled in his studies. His mind was "the ideal
scholar's tool."2 Isaacs's dual law and economics degrees helped
him develop an interdisciplinary view of business and law.o After
a few years of private law practice, Isaacs began his teaching
career at Cincinnati Law School in 1912." The school possessed a
Sabbath morning regardless of whether the service was finished. KLEIN, Seventh Son,
supra note 8, at 71.
26. See Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 592-93.
27. See infra Part IV.C, V (discussing Isaacs's view of Biblical and Jewish law).
28. See BOGEN, supra note 21, at 73 (stating that the disappointed Orthodox
parents of straying offspring often pointed to Abraham Isaacs's sons and said "[they, too,
are in the university and excel every one [sic] in scholarship and yet they are faithful").
Nathan Isaacs's siblings were remarkably successful. KLEIN, Seventh Son, supra note 8,
at 73-74. Four of the siblings were included in Who's Who in America and eight were
members of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at
578. Aaron, the oldest son, was a businessperson. Isaac also became a businessperson.
KLEIN, Seventh Son, supra note 8, at 73. Schachne became an army psychologist at
Walter Reed Hospital in Washington D.C. Raphael Isaacs was a prominent doctor and
scientist known especially for his work on blood disorders. Nesha was an instructor in
Political Science at the University of Cincinnati before her marriage. Elcanan Isaacs,
MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 577. Elcanan was a graduate of the University of
Cincinnati Law School who also earned a Harvard S.J.D. and taught at American
University. See Contributors, in MEN OF THE SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 713, 718. Moses
Legis was an Assistant Professor at Columbia University, Dean of Yeshiva College, and
Professor of Chemistry at Stern College of Yeshiva University. Asher became an
economist and professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Judah, the youngest, ran his own
insurance business. KLEIN, Seventh Son, supra note 8, at 74.
29. Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 582 (quoting Albert M.
Freiberg, Nathan Isaacs in Cambridge 3 (July 15, 1952) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Hebrew College Library)).
30. Isaacs was especially close with his economics professor in Cincinnati, Fred C.
Hicks, who later became President of the University of Cincinnati. See Letter from Fred
C. Hicks to Nathan Isaacs (Aug. 23, 1920) (on file with the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of
the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio). The Carnegie Institution financially
supported Isaacs's research for his doctorate in economics. Isaacs Memorandum, June 24,
1917, supra note 13.
31. In 1897, the Cincinnati Law School merged with the University of Cincinnati
Law Department. The first Dean of the merged school was William Howard Taft. Faculty
members included Dr. Gustavus H. Wald and J. Doddridge Brannan, both of whom had
studied under Christopher C. Langdell. They would help the school adopt Langdell's case
method approach to law study. See Roscoe L. Barrow, Historical Note on the University of
308 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [47:2
library that included an extensive collection of legal history
materials.32 Isaacs encountered the books of European legal
historians including Frederic William Maitland, Frederick
Pollock, and Paul Vinogradoff." He would draw from these legal
historians and the historical and critical minded "Science of
Judaism" school of thought in developing his theory of legal
change." These studies led Isaacs to conclude that the Jewish
Reform movement, as well as American commercial law, had
become overly doctrinaire and insensitive to historical
experience." In 1919, Isaacs moved to Cambridge to begin
graduate study at Harvard Law School." His service in U.S.
Army intelligence during World War I interrupted his studies.
Isaacs reached the rank of captain quickly." White Russian
agents had succeeded in convincing many in the American
government that The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was an
accurate description of a Jewish plot against the U.S.
government; Isaacs helped to expose the fraud."
Cincinnati College of Law (Cincinnati Law School), in THE LAW IN SOUTHWESTERN OHIO
289, 294 (Compiled by Frank G. Davis, George P. Stimson ed., 1972). These teachers
probably influenced Isaacs.
32. Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 579. The work of the great
English legal historian, Sir Frederick Pollock, was influential at Cincinnati Law School.
Dean Wald was the editor of the American edition of Pollock's casebook. See SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (Gustavus Henry
Wald & Samuel Williston eds., 1906). When in 1903 the Law School dedicated a new
building, Pollock gave the keynote address on the virtues of the common law. Barrow,
supra note 31, at 295. Isaacs, still a student, was present at the dedication. Letter from
Nathan Isaacs to Adolph S. Oko (June 8, 1936) (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of
the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 3). Isaacs
considered Pollock a powerful influence on his own legal thinking. Isaacs to Oko Letter,
July 10, 1936, supra note 13. Dean Rogers's address at the building dedication might also
have had an influence on the young Isaacs. Rogers declared that: "The proper laws of a
community may ... exist ... often in contradiction to those which are declared." Barrow,
supra note 31, at 295. In his own career, Isaacs would pursue similar ideas regarding the
historical evolution of the law.
33. See Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 26 YALE L.J. 512, 513 (1917) (reviewing RALPH
W. AIGLER, TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY, ACQUIRED ORIGINALLY AND BY TRANSFER INTER
VIvos (1916)) (singling out for praise Maitland, Pollock, and Vinogradoff).
34. See Adolph S. Oko & Nathan Isaacs, Correspondence Between a Jurist and a
Bookman, 4 MENORAH J. 73, 80, 82-83 (1918) (calling for the writing of a history of Jewish
Law inspired by Maitland and Wissenschaft des Judeathums).
35. Isaacs reacted against the attitude of the Cincinnati Jewish Reform Rabbis of
his youth, for whom "questioning [of Reform doctrine] was heresy and heresy-hunting was a
great game." Letter from Nathan Isaacs to Henry Hurwitz (June 3, 1926) (on file with Jacob
Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Box 8, File 2).
36 See Nathan Isaacs, The Future of the Jewish Student in America, 5 JEWISH F.
131, 131 (1922).
37. Letter from Ella Isaacs to Max Davis (Ella's uncle) (n.d.) (on file with American
Jewish Historical Society).
38. See Nathan Isaacs, The International Jew, 6 MENORAH J. 355, 356-60 (1920)
(recounting in an indirect manner wide acceptance of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
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Upon Isaacs's return to Harvard in 1919, he both taught and
attended classes as the recipient of the Thayer Scholarship at
Harvard Law School." He took classes taught by Roscoe Pound,
Joseph H. Beale, and legal historian Eugene Wambaugh. Isaacs
would develop his realist insights under the tutelage of two
diametrically opposed legal scholars-Beale and Pound.40 Pound,
although part of the "old guard," is considered a proto-realist.
Contrary to the more classical mindset of Samuel Williston and
Beale, Pound saw the need for a new jurisprudence to address
the indeterminacy of the existing one.
After earning his S.J.D., Isaacs would return to Harvard a
few years later to teach as a lecturer at the Harvard Business
School. Isaacs found himself in a delicate and uncertain position.
The President of Harvard, Abbott Lawrence Lowell, was an anti-
Semite who had in the previous year publicly pushed for a quota
system for admissions of Jewish students. It was not then
publicly known that Dean Donham of the Harvard Business
School had been a leading advocate of the quota system.4 2
Nonetheless, with the support of Dean Pound of the law school
and then its debunking within intelligence circles, which was apparently based on
personal involvement).
39. Letter from Nathan Isaacs to Max Davis (Mar. 29, 1919) (on file with American
Jewish Historical Society).
40. See The Class Notes of Nathan Isaacs, 1919-1920, Harvard Depository Class
Notes Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass. This collection consists
of class notes on administrative law, equity, international law, conflict of laws,
jurisprudence, and Roman law, given by various members of the faculty, including Pound,
Beale, and Francis B. Sayre.
41. MORTON & PHYLLIS KELLER, MAING HARVARD MODERN: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S UNIvERSITY 47 (2001). Despite an official rejection of the plan by a faculty
committee, anti-Jewish quota restrictions were covertly put in place by 1926. Id. at 48;
RITTERBAND & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 114. The faculty committee that rejected the
quota proposition included Isaacs's friend and brilliant historian of Jewish philosophy,
Harry Wolfson. RITrERBAND & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 111. The pair became
"intimately associated" in their work. Letter from Nathan Isaacs to Judge Julian W. Mack
(Jan. 23, 1925) (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives,
Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 2).
42. MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNorr, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 70, 89 (1979). Donham
had argued to the Committee on Methods of Sifting Candidates for Admission that there
were two different types of Jews; one type of Jew desired "complete assimilation," while
the other type desired to retain its separate group identity. Id. at 86. Donham asserted
that "very serious racial antagonism" would result if too many separatist Jews were
admitted into Harvard. Id. at 86-87. Donham had worked on the Subcommittee on
Statistics, which developed an intricate method to identify Jews, and which later was
used in the covert exclusion of Jews. Id. at 93, 107-08. Each Harvard student was divided
into four categories: "J,," J,," "J." and "Other." The J, groups were deemed certainly to be
Jewish. A "preponderance of the evidence" indicated that the J,'s were Jews, while J,'s
were possible Jews. JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION
AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 96 (2005).
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and Dean Donham, President Lowell, after initially ignoring the
request, gave Isaacs a permanent position." It seems that
Donham's prejudice did not prevent him from recognizing the
worth of Isaacs's scholarship on the intersection of business and
law." After only a single year of teaching at Harvard, Isaacs
became one of the very few publicly self-identified Jewish
members of the tenured faculty at Harvard University in 1924.45
That same year, Dean Donham and Isaacs took the radical step
of eliminating the courses of business law at Harvard Business
School." Instead, they put Donham's dedication to the case
method of teaching business students and Isaacs's theory that
law should serve the needs of business into pedagogical practice
by having Isaacs sit in classes and give legal advice as the
students grappled with business dilemmas.47 Though Isaacs
eventually returned to teaching a standard business law class, in
his teaching Isaacs continued his innovative approach of training
43. Though Wolfson told Isaacs that Donham had been a leader of those supporting
the quota on the faculty committee that had considered the question, the grateful Isaacs
could not "believe it." Isaacs refused to pay "much attention to the gossip because it fails
to correspond in so many particulars with what I find." Donham and his wife had been
extremely cordial to Nathan and his wife Ella. Donham's son befriended Nathan's
youngest brother Judah, who was then an undergraduate at Harvard. Isaacs was
impressed that "[elven the Lowell's have gone out of their way to be friendly." Letter from
Nathan Isaacs to Adolph S. Oko (Nov. 14, 1923) (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center
of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 2).
44. At memorial services held for Isaacs at Harvard on December 21, 1941, Donham
said that he had considered Isaacs to be "[cllearly the most scholarly man among us,
unique in his own field." W.B. Donham, Eulogy for Nathan Isaacs (Dec. 21, 1941) (on file
with American Jewish Historical Society); see also Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra
note 8, at 593. Due to his association with Isaacs, Donham eventually arrived at a better
understanding of Judaism. See Donham, supra ("All in all, by his life and his strict
adherence to his intellectual, ethical and religious standards coupled with tolerance for
the views of others, he gave those of us who adhere to other varieties of religious
experience, some conception of the strength and majesty of the ancient Hebrew faith.").
45. Wins Professorship for One Year of Lecturing: Mr. Nathan Isaacs Appointed to
Chair of Business Law While on Leave of Absence from Pittsburgh, HARVARD CRIMSON,
Mar. 4, 1924 (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School,
Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings 1924-1941). A few other Jews had previously received
tenured chairs at Harvard. See SUSANNE KLINGENSTEIN, JEWS IN THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY, 1900-1940: THE DYNAMICS OF INTELLECTUAL ASSIMILATION 10, 12 (1998)
(observing that Leo Wiener became Harvard University's first Jewish tenured professor in
1911, but Wiener was conflicted about his Judaism and identified as a Russian); see also
HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 12 (1960)
(Frankfurter was named Byrne Professor of Administrative law in 1921). Harry Wolfson
received a tenured appointment in 1925. JONATHAN COHEN, PHILOSOPHERS AND SCHOLARS:
WOLFSON, GUrrMANN, AND STRAUSS ON THE HISTORY OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 31(2007).
46. Future Clients Told How to Consult Lawyers: Potential Business Men Are Given
Suggestions on How to Save Themselves Work and Trouble (1924) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper
Clippings, 1924-1941). No masthead information is present on the document.
47. Id.
2010] BEYOND RULES 311
students to view law as a tool to solve business problems rather
than an independent realm of knowledge."
After finding his permanent home at Harvard Business
School, Isaacs devoted much of his spare time to the
organizational life of causes he cared about and to Jewish
education.4 9 He was a "[pirofound scholar" and "saintly soul" who
"never took himself too seriously in the presence of others."o
Isaacs had a biting and cynical sense of humor, which he would
sometimes unleash on shoddy scholars and the many demanding
people who came for his help, "but he was always charitable and
generous.""1 Following many stressful years of helping refugees
flee Nazi Germany and settling them in the United States, Isaacs
died a premature death in 1941.52
Howard L. Bevis, President of Ohio State University,
eulogized that his boyhood companion and best friend possessed:
[An] intellect [that] ranged through time and across the
whole field of human understanding. His deeply religious
nature comprehended the ethnic development of his people
in all of its religious significance. He knew the detail of
dogma. He knew the broad sweep of human aspiration in its
reaching for the Infinite. He knew the frailties of men; and
all of his profundity was suffused by a human kindliness
which made children love him....
He gave his life to the betterment of mankind.53
48. Adolf S. Oko, Notes for Isaacs Eulogy for the Menorah Journal (n.d.) (on file
with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko
Papers, Box 9, File 12).
49. Rabbi Joseph S. Shubow, Professor Nathan Isaacs, Saint and Scholar-Zeker
Tsaddik Le-Berakah, JEWISH ADVOCATE (Boston), Jan. 23, 1942 (on file with American
Jewish Historical Society). A devoted former student, who became a prominent Boston
Rabbi, summarized in an obituary that:
[Isaacs] was president of the Menorah Educational Conference since 1923,
and of the Boston Bureau of Jewish Education since 1925; he was a trustee of
the Jewish Teachers College of Boston, and of the Associated Jewish
Philanthropies of Boston; he was a member of the American Bar Association,
Association of Collegiate Teachers of Business Law, the American Arbitration
Association, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Societas
Spinozana, the Soncino Gesellschaft, the History of Sciences Society; a
director of Gimbel Brothers; and, of course, a Phi Beta Kappa member. And
the remarkable thing about it all is that in the midst of this amazingly





52. See Elcanan Isaacs, MEN OF SPIRIT, supra note 8, at 579.
53. Howard L. Bevis, Remarks Made at the Memorial for Nathan Isaacs Held in
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III. ISAACS'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN LAW
The most cited contributions made by Isaacs come from
numerous areas of law and remain influential to this day. His
1917 Yale Law Journal article The Standardizing of Contracts
was the first to alert academe to the problem of standard form
contracting within the framework of classical contract law and
legal formalism.54 Professor Bates frames this debate and
Isaacs's cautionary role by observing that "the inability of
contract law and legal scholars to grasp effectively the
phenomenon of standard form contracts has done little to help
the consumer, it has certainly made Nathan Isaacs the most
remarkable sage of the twentieth century."" Isaacs's early
defense of strict liability in tort was rooted in the same
contextual viewpoint that spurred his contracts scholarship." In
constitutional law, Isaacs critiqued the Supreme Court decisions
during the Lochner era as overly literal interpretations of the
contract clause and improperly based upon an unhistorical
understanding of the Founders' view of freedom of contract. His
1927 Harvard Law Review article Two Views of Commercial
Arbitration" provides a framework for arbitration models still
debated today. One model casts the arbitrator in the role of
judge; the other views the arbitrator as agent. The rest of this
Part will briefly examine Isaacs's contributions to these areas of
law.
A. Law of Contracts
Isaacs developed a cyclical theory of the standardization of
contracts that took issue with the widely accepted assessment of
nineteenth century scholar Henry Sumner Maine" that legal
Baker Hall, Harvard University (Dec. 21, 1941) (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Obituary, 1941).
54. See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917)
[hereinafter Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts].
55. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A
Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 1 (2002).
56. See Nathan Isaacs, Fault and Liability: Two Views of Legal Development, 31
HARV. L. REV. 954, 966-67 (1918) [hereinafter Isaacs, Fault and Liability].
57. See Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929,
932-34 (1927) [hereinafter Isaacs, Two Views].
58. Id.; see also Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its
Implications for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006) (noting
that Isaacs provided the first academic discussion of these two models).
59. Maine famously asserted that "we may say that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." HENRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Beacon Press 1963) (1861).
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development moves in a linear fashion from status-based to
contract-based legal relationships."o Instead, Isaacs argued that
over the course of time contract law had repeatedly cycled back
and forth between the broader categories of "individualized
relations," in which the law places great weight upon the
subjective will of the parties, to the alternative extreme of
"standardized relations," in which the law imposes contracts
based upon the status of the parties irrespective of attempts to
contract out of that status.6 ' He also believed that the eras of
individualized relations were associated with an expansive
equitable approach to legal interpretation and that the periods of
standardized relations were associated with codification and
literalistic judicial interpretation.6 2 Isaacs's cycle theory was
heavily influenced by his study of Jewish law.63 He felt that the
social needs of the twentieth century required a return to the
creation of legal relationships based on status for those "whom
freedom of contract" had "become a mere mockery."64
Duncan Kennedy groups Isaacs with Roscoe Pound and
Morris Cohen because of their use of an analytical methodology
that seeks to place specific areas or issues of law within the
context of underlying interests and principles.'" In this way,
those specific areas of law could be critiqued for congruence with
the underlying principles and interests that they supposedly
serve. Under this hypothesis, a given interest or interests that
predominate in a particular area should be used to explain the
rules within that area of law. Isaacs believed that these
underlying interests varied in a cyclical movement between
individualist and relational norms. The normative structure of
the law wavered between these poles in responding to "prevailing
social and economic conditions."6 6
60. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 34-37.
61. Id. at 39.
62. Nathan Isaacs, "The Law" and the Law of Change II, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 748, 757
n.61 (1917) [hereinafter Isaacs, Law of Change II] (suggesting that the progress from
status to contract is a "mark of commentatorial periods rather than a continuous factor in
the history of law" and noting the contemporary growing use in statutes of the phrase
"any provision in any contract to the contrary notwithstanding").
63. Nathan Isaacs, "The Law" and the Law of Change 1, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 665
(1917); Isaacs, Law of Change II, supra note 62, at 748; see Samuel Flaks, Note, Nathan
Isaacs's IDEIA: Legal Evolution and Parental Pro Se Representation of Students with
Disabilities, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 283 (2009) (explaining aspects of Isaacs's cycle
theory and applying it to a modern statute).
64. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 47.
65. Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy:
Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 120 (2000) (citing Isaacs,
Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 40-41).
66. Id. at 120.
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Professor Weisbrod notes the importance of Isaacs's insight
that "one should get away from an idea of legal history progress
as movement ... in one direction or another, and see 'a kind of
pendulum movement back and forth between periods of
standardization and periods of individualization." Isaacs not
only placed the standardization of contract, and more generally,
the unification of contract law, in a historical context, but also
challenged the existence of mutual assent in standard form
contracting." He also recognized the role of bargaining power in
the drafting of contract terms. Isaacs's solution was the
incorporation of community- or law-determined standard terms."
It was in Isaacs's The Standardizing of Contracts article that
the term "standard" was first applied to contracts.7 ' He
challenged the ability of contract law to adequately deal with
standard form contracts within a unitary view of contracts. 72 The
conundrum of standard form contracts as a different category of
contracts requiring specialized rules remains the center of debate
even to the present. Isaacs noted that standard form contracting
was not the pure exercise of the freedom of contract that
underpinned the will theory and private autonomy principle of
classical contract law." The "problem" posed by standard form
contracting to classical contract theory was the strained
67. Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 11, at 788 (quoting Isaacs, Standardizing
Contracts, supra note 54, at 40).
68. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 46.
69. See id. at 47 (noting standardizing contracts might help with the accident of
power in individual bargaining).
70. Germany adopted this system in the most recent revision of its Commercial
Code (BGB). See SIR BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE
GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT 171 (2006) ("According to § 305 I BGB, standard terms are
those terms which have been devised for use in a multitude of contracts . . . .").
71. Professor Shell traces scholarly concern for adhesion contracts to the work of
Isaacs:
[Isaacs argued] that contract law should promote "freedom in the positive sense
of presence of opportunity" and that the law should strive toward
"standardizing ... the relations in which society has an interest, in order to
remove them from the control of the accident of power in individual bargaining."
G. Richard Shell, Federal Versus State Law in the Interpretation of Contracts Containing
Arbitration Clauses: Reflections on Mastrobuono, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 43, 64 n.109 (1996)
(quoting Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 47).
72. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 1, at 78-79, 82 (providing excerpts
from Standardizing Contracts as an example of a realist analysis that highlighted the
conflict between the will theory of contract and early twentieth century legal developments).
73. Professor Weisbrod more recently argued that Standardizing of Contracts
demonstrated the malleability of the consent principle: "All relationships can also be seen
through the law of contracts-some more comfortably than others. By bending and
twisting the idea of choice, most relationships can be understood as chosen, even if the
choice is the refusal of an association." Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 11, at 807
(footnote omitted).
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application of the consent principle to boilerplate or standard
terms .
Classical contract theory was embedded in the two
cornerstone documents of Isaacs's time, which were both
authored by Samuel Williston-the First Restatement of
Contracts and the Uniform Sales Act (1906) . As to the latter,
Isaacs described it as a standardized contract for both sales and
purchases, which had the unfortunate drawback "that the
contract made for us by the Sales Act might not under a given set
of conditions be the contract that we would have made for
ourselves if the various points had been called to our
attention."7  He argued that the Uniform Sales Act did not
adequately take into consideration the needs of the modern
purchasing agent, who, far from being a true independent
contracting agent, was effectively controlled by the discipline of
manufacturers and retailers." The Sales Act did not serve the
needs of middlemen.
We see here the notion of what is now called the hypothetical
bargain. Under hypothetical bargain theory, the implied terms
or default rules of contract law are based upon what the parties
would have agreed to if operating under full information at the
time of formation. This implied hypothetical intent results in
efficient implied terms because it mimics what the parties' intent
would have produced. An alternative formulation of this
approach is Isaacs's argument that the default rules in the
Uniform Sales Act had grown hopelessly divergent to the
customs and practices found in the business world. Llewellyn
would later use this approach to infuse the rules of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) with recognition of the contextual
nature of contracts and ongoing commercial practice."o In this
way, the default rules of contract are made to merge with the
private parties' hypothetical bargain.
74. "The contractual view focuses on individual autonomy in a way that denies
much reality in the world." Id. at 808.
75. Austin W. Scott, In Memoriam, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1330-
31 (1963).
76. Nathan Isaacs, Address Before the Rochester Association of Purchasing Agents:
Some Legal Aspects of Purchasing 3 (Nov. 16, 1932) (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches, 1934).
77. See id. at 1.
78. See Nathan Isaacs, The Dealer-Purchaser, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 373 (1927).
79. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1877 (1991) ("[Hlypothetical bargain formulation
conceals a complex set of issues.").
80. See infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text (noting Isaacs's influence on
Llewellyn as he drafted the U.C.C.).
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Isaacs was committed to a contextual approach to contract
interpretation and to the interpretation-application of contract
rules. Under this approach, classical contract theory's major tenets
relating to contract interpretation-duty to read, four-corners
analysis, and the plain meaning rule-would be jettisoned in favor
of a more nuanced exploration of contractual context. He argued
that "analysis is necessary in every case in which rights and duties
are considered to explain agreements far beyond the words used in
the light of customs, past dealings of the parties, business
understandings, and presumptions laid down in statutes and in
the common law."' The UCC would later incorporate the tenets of
contextual interpretation." Isaacs's observation made clear that
the goal of contract rule application was to ascertain the intent of
the parties as situated within the business world.
The abstraction of classical contract theory treated standard
forms as traditional contracts, which resulted in diminishing the
power of the private autonomy principle." The judiciary felt the
need to adjust other doctrines of contract law to compensate for
injustices caused by this single model approach. The expansion of
the doctrine of unconscionability from equitable principle to legal
principle is one such adjustment.84 The development of the
implied duty of good faith is another example."
Isaacs charged that this diminished exercise of "private will"
would and should lead to status-oriented rules for certain
categories of contracts. He viewed standard form contracts as a
"practical check on the individuality of contracts, if not a
81. Nathan Isaacs, 2 Use of Law in Business, Chapter 1 [4], The Contract Idea, at
13 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Box 4, File: Use of Law in Business-Part II, undated)
(Originally written prior to 1933, hand written stylistic revision post Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
82. See William H. Simon, The Belated Decline of Literalism in Professional
Responsibility Doctrine: Soft Deception and the Rule of Law, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1881,
1884 (2002) ("[Bloth the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial
Code mandate Contextual interpretation of contract terms.").
83. Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming
Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITr. L.
REV. 839,886 (1999).
84. See Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Interpretation in the Realm of Idealism,
5 DEPAuL Bus. & COM. L.J. 17, 18-19 (2006) (explaining that Llewellyn adopted equitable
rules like unconscionability into the U.C.C. to prevent injustices that would occur
under a mechanical application of rigid rules); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (2008)
(providing a legal framework within which to determine whether a contract is
unconscionable).
85. See James J. Fishman, Introduction: The Enduring Legacy of Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REv. 161, 176 (2008) (discussing the influence of Judge
Cardozo on the development of the implied duty of good faith).
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theoretical limitation on the freedom of contract."" After The
Standardizing of Contracts, contract theory has failed to properly
adjust by continuing to rationalize the enforcement of such
contracts through the rubric of unitary contract principles.
Isaacs's prediction that status would make a major comeback 8 is
seen in the enactment of consumer protection laws, the merchant-
consumer distinction in commercial law, and the good faith and
implied-in-fact exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
The oscillation between status and contract in Isaacs's
analysis included a normative role for society and law. Given the
role of standardized relations and agreements in a complicated,
consumer-oriented marketplace, society needed to intervene
through law to protect the weaker party in the standardized
relationship. Isaacs was led by this reasoning to criticize the
Lochner-era" courts' hostility towards minimum wage legislation.
For Isaacs, labor legislation was a form of standardizing
employment relations necessary "to remove [society] from the
control of the accident of power in individual bargaining."o
Professor Bridwell notes that Isaacs's article The Standardizing
of Contracts drew the important "distinction between positive
and negative freedom."" Isaacs advanced the idea that freedom of
contract was not by itself a surrogate for personal liberty.9
Instead, freedom of contract was susceptible to abuse by
contracting parties with superior bargaining power. The one-
sidedness created by the use of superior bargaining power
86. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 39.
87. A recent case-coding project showed that the lack of "strong" consent weighed
heavily on courts' application of the doctrine of unconscionability. This demonstrates the
importance of finding meaningful consent even to a doctrine largely premised upon
concerns of substantive fairness. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent
Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1067, 1111-12 (2006).
88. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 40.
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 57 (1905) (holding that the "right of free
contract" was implicit in the due process clause).
90. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 38 n.17, 47 (discussing the
extent of police power over the right to contract and asserting that "still much [may] be
gained by the further standardizing of the relations in which society has an interest"); see
also Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2239-40 (1992) (book review) (citing Isaacs, Standardizing of
Contracts, supra note 54, and explaining the important role status continues to play in
modern law).
91. Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHi. L. REV. 1513, 1520 n.30 (2003).
92. See id. at 1519-20 & n.28 ("Isaacs's comment that the attack on standard-form
contracts was premised on the idea that '[fireedom of contract is not synonymous with liberty'
illustrates the departure from the tenet of negative freedom that equated freedom of contract
and personal liberty." (quoting Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 47)).
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dictated the intervention of the law to reorder relationships
initially created by contract in order to protect the weaker party
from overreaching." This reordering would transform standard
contracts from being solely industry-generated to quasi-private,
quasi-public creations.
Isaacs's approach to the enforcement of standard contracts
was a mix of contract-based and status-based legal regimes. He
explains that in their "origin, these relations are, of course,
contractual; in their workings, they recall the rigime of status."94
The later realists would call this the illusion of the public-private
distinction. The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement would
use this argument to support the thesis that the liberal legal
order was built upon layers of contradiction." As we have seen,
Isaacs uses the public-private distinction to describe the ongoing
cyclical evolution of law." He also implies a normative
assessment that the blurring or melding of public-private law is
a necessary and efficient means of dealing with standard
contracts. 7
Isaacs's cycle theory can be seen as a linear-cyclical blend.
Types of relationships are formed through a purely contract-
based legal regime. Over time, abuses of freedom of contract
result in the law converting the relationship to a partially status-
based one. Contractual rights and duties are determined by
status-based and contract-based principles depending on the
93. Isaacs gave the example of the insurance contract in which overreaching by the
insurance industry led to government intervention. NATHAN ISAACS, THE LAW IN
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 217 (rev. ed. 1934); see also Carol Weisbrod, War, Insurance and
Some Problems of Community, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 109, 111-13 (2003) (comparing Isaacs's
views of bargaining power in insurance contracts with those of Josiah Royce).
94. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 39; see also Allen R. Kamp,
Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275,
283 (1998). Isaacs refers to the standardizing of insurance contracts and bills of lading as
other examples of the trend from contract-based law to status-based law. Isaacs,
Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 38-39.
95. The public-private distinction held that some areas of law were within the
private sphere and others within the public. Politically conceived it has been viewed "in
terms of the administrative state [with] the 'public' realm [being] distinguished by the use
of legitimate coercion and the authoritative direction of collective outcomes, as opposed to
formally voluntary contract ... based on market exchange." Jeff Weintraub, The Theory
and Politics of the PubliclPrivate Distinction, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 36 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar
eds., 1997). The realist and CLS scholars attacked the distinction as masking the power of
the government and courts in the shaping of private law. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 10-11 (1928) (providing a legal realist
critique of the notion that property law was solely within the private sphere); Duncan
Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1982) (providing a CLS critique).
96. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 39.
97. Id. at 38-39.
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particular term or issue. This eventually results in parties
contracting away from the status-based relationship and creating
new contract-based relationships with new sets of rights and
duties. This process continues ad infinitum with freedom of
contract providing the means for the creation of novel types of
relationships and the law infusing them with status-based
qualities." Isaacs saw the status-based elements of the law as a
grassroots creation in which community norms and practices
become incorporated into the status-based relationship and
subsequently incorporated into law. This is the perspective more
deeply developed by Llewellyn in his scholarship and work on the
UCC. The importance of trade usage and business custom in the
UCC's interpretive methodologies is a testament to this belief
that most of commercial law comes from the recognition of real-
world commercial practice. However, for Isaacs this quest was
not so simple. He believed that any complete theory of legal
evolution needed to discover universal principles and allow those
principles to accommodate change. The role of general principles
in legal evolution will be more fully explored in Part VII's
coverage of legal reasoning.
B. Tort Law
Much as he contested the inexorable march from status to
contract, Isaacs also contested the claim that civilization had
linearly progressed from strict liability to a morality-based
negligence principle in tort law. The context of Isaacs's work in
this field, as revealed by his lecture notes, was a wave of state
high court rulings at the turn of the twentieth century, which
had held that workers' compensation laws were an
unconstitutional imposition of liability without proving fault."
Isaacs took issue with the fault-based rationale of the negligence
standard in tort law.'o The need for personal culpability was a
central construct of classical tort theory.'0 ' Isaacs, as a realist and
observer of social context, recognized that the rise of industrial
society necessitated the recognition of other grounds of liability,
98. Morris Cohen would adopt this insight of the quasi-status, quasi-contract track
of legal development in his oft-cited The Basis of Contract. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis
of Contract Law, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558, 560-64, 587 (1933) (arguing that private
agreements still affect the public interest and that the government retains the right to
intervene into private contracts through regulation).
99. Nathan Isaacs, Legal History Lecture 8 (Jan. 15, 1923) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File: History Lecture, 15
January 1923).
100. See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, supra note 56, at 974.
101. See id. at 957-59.
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such as strict liability. Professor Horwitz has explained that
Isaacs's pro-standardization and pro-strict liability stance was
unique among contemporary tort scholars, almost all of whom
had retreated to a subjectivist position in order to defend the
negligence principle. 02 From a review of Anglo-American legal
history, Isaacs concluded tort law had alternated between the
principles of negligence and strict liability. He argued that the
shift to a mass-production economy warranted a return to strict
liability.0 o Isaacs saw that strict liability was needed to police
culpable conduct independent of individual culpability.104 This
development came to pass with the acceptance of strict products
liability.
Isaacs insisted that the variation in the law between
negligence and strict liability was not caused by any inevitable
evolution but by the constant challenge of reconciling changing
realities with moral principles. Defending the supposedly amoral
doctrine of strict liability, he argued that "a re-defining of
external standards seems necessary. If the moral notion that
links fault with liability must to some extent be violated, our
position must not be interpreted as the abandonment of an ideal;
it is but a new recognition of a human limitation from which
human law cannot be free." 05
C. Constitutional Law
The cycle theory had a powerful influence on Isaacs's
understanding of American constitutional law. Isaacs sought to
develop a theory of jurisprudence that would, by putting the
Supreme Court's method of constitutional interpretation in
historical context, intellectually undermine the Supreme Court's
102. See HORwlTz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that Isaacs
recognized "that objectivism had already cleared away the most powerful individualistic
objections to strict liability").
103. See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, supra note 56, at 960-62 (explaining that tort
law has historically alternated between liability based on fault and liability without fault,
and classifying liability in modern society within the latter); Nathan Isaacs, Quasi-Delict
in Anglo-American Law, 31 YALE. L.J. 571, 573 (1922) (explaining the need to include new
types of liability without fault within the realm of tort doctrine); see also Edwin M.
Borchard, Introduction to THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY xxxv, xxxv-xxxvi (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1969) (1918) (suggesting the
possibility that "in the field of labor legislation, a reaction against Sir Henry Maine's
theory of evolution from status to contract or merely a recognition of the necessity for
greater protection of the social interests of the state" was ongoing).
104. Isaacs challenged established authorities on this subject. "Nathan
Isaacs ... marshaled in evidence that both Holmes and Wigmore were wrong about
historical tort rules of England being devoid of moral sense." Nelson P. Miller, An Ancient
Law of Care, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 4 (2004).
105. Isaacs, Fault and Liability, supra note 56, at 978.
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Lochner-era doctrine, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected substantive economic rights.o' Isaacs grounded his
criticism of the Lochner-era Court on the belief that the
Constitution was, in essence, a "code."' 7 He derided the Court for
having turned "to literalism and to fictions"' 8 in the interpretation
of that code and claimed that "[miuch of the vaunted
Constitutional Law" of the nineteenth century "was the merest
word-study" in which words were stretched beyond their normal
meanings."o For example, legal fictions preserved the Electoral
College and created federal jurisdiction over corporations."o In the
aftermath of the vast expansion of the federal government's power
during World War I, Isaacs argued that the Supreme Court had
stretched the words "interstate commerce" in the Constitution
"until they almost burst.""' Yet, even legal fictions have their
limits: "It is easier to read a current economic concept into the
Constitution than to read it out again when it ceases to be
current.""' While acknowledging that the Founders did not
anticipate modern conditions, Isaacs boldly pronounced that "we
are entering just now after one hundred and fifty years nearly
upon a second phase of constitutional interpretation in which we
are trying to get at the spirit of the t[h]ing, rather frankly
confessing that the letter is not the whole thing.""' Isaacs
suggested that an equitable way of studying the Constitution
would be to try to understand the thought of the men who wrote it
as an aide in discovering general constitutional principles.
Isaacs felt that the greatest legal battles of his day were
"being fought over statutory collisions with the principle of
freedom of contract.""' One of the purposes of Isaacs's
106. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905) (invalidating a New York labor
law on the premise that people have the liberty and right to contract freely for employment).
107. See Flaks, supra note 63, at 280 n.42 (quoting Nathan Isaacs, Cases and
Documents Illustrative of Anglo-American Legal History 4 (1917) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School Library)) (noting a trend toward legislative
codification of the law and pondering whether this law would be inundated with "fictions"
as constitutional law had been).
108. Id.
109. Nathan Isaacs, The Securities Act and the Constitution, 43 YALE L.J. 218, 220
(1933) [hereinafter Isaacs, Securities Act].
110. Id.
111. Nathan Isaacs, Legal History Lecture 8 (Dec. 4, 1922) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File: Legal History
Lecture, 27 October 1922).
112. Isaacs, Securities Act, supra note 109, at 220.
113. Nathan Isaacs, Lecture on Legal History 3 (Jan. 8, 1923) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File: Lecture on Legal
History, 8 January 1923).
114. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 38 n.17.
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groundbreaking analysis of the history of contracts and torts was
to reveal the unhistorical nature of the Lochner-era Court's
opposition to interfering with the freedom of contract, or in the
imposition of strict liability."- Isaacs argued that the Founding
Fathers' and John Marshall's understanding of contract law was
very different from that of the Lochner Court."' In a 1922 lecture
on legal history, Isaacs argued that decisions that had declared
the inviolability of freedom of contract were the product of
Justices who had been in "the habit of talking about natural
rights. Whenever they wanted to prove that a man had a certain
right, all they had to do was to say that it was natural.""' In the
end, Isaacs's cycle theory of legal development molded his views
on contract and tort law, as well as constitutional law. As
discussed above, Isaacs did not think, as the influential Maine
had, that civilization inexorably progressed "from Status to
Contract.""' Minimum wage legislation, maximum work hour
legislation, and collective bargaining of labor contracts were
perhaps the most significant examples of retreats from absolute
freedom of contract."' While Isaacs thought that governmental
regulation in status-based relationships, such as employment,
was warranted in the 1910s and the 1920s, he was a critic of
later New Deal legislation as unconstitutionally antibusiness.
Part VI will examine Isaacs's critique of the New Deal.
D. Two Views ofArbitration
Perhaps prompted by the passage of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), 2 o Isaacs provided the first full analysis of the status
115. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 1, at 78-79.
116. Nathan Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts: A Study in Early American Juristic
Theory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413, 417 (1921).
117. Nathan Isaacs, Second Lecture in Legal History 3 (Oct. 9, 1922) (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File: Lecture on
Legal History, 5 October 1922). Isaacs mocked Justices who were accustomed to thinking
of Adam Smith's "economic theory as the law of nature."Id.
118. MAINE, supra note 59, at 165; Nathan Isaacs, Technique of Legal Research 12-13
[hereinafter Isaacs, Appendix Technique] (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Unpublished writings, T).
119. See Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 47.
120. The FAA provided that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1926).
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and role of arbitration in society.'2' In his 1927 Harvard Law
Review article, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, he
sketched two models of arbitration-the arbitrator as judge
model and the arbitrator as agent model.122 Isaacs referred to the
former model as the "legalistic view" and the latter as the
"realistic view.""' Isaacs feared that the adoption of the legalistic
view would make arbitration litigation-like and would leave
arbitration bereft of most of its benefits as a unique means of
dispute resolution.'24 He argued that parties should opt towards
treating the arbitrator as an agent of the parties instead of as a
substitute judge.12 Professor Schmitz notes that Isaacs
"emphasized that judicial review of awards would foster
legalistic, 'trial-like' arbitration complete with formal procedure,
records and opinions."'26 Isaacs's argument that arbitration would
lose its effectiveness as a tool of business if there was a far
ranging judicial review of arbitration decisions, made only
121. Kirgis, supra note 58, at 27 n.148.
122. See Isaacs, Two Views, supra note 57.
123. Id. at 929.
The proper role of an arbitrator was transforming in the colonies and it
remained unclear in the nineteenth-century. In a Harvard Law Review article,
Nathan Isaacs contrasted the "legalistic view," which likens arbitrators to
judges, with the "realistic view," generally adhered to by businesspeople, who see
arbitrators as agents of the parties.
Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The Neutrality of Party-
Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1834 (2003)
(citing Isaacs, Two Views, supra note 57, at 932).
124. See Isaacs, Two Views, supra note 57, at 937-38. Seventy years later, a scholar
would note that:
Nathan Isaacs posed the question, "Is arbitration a mode of trial or a substitute
for trial of so different a nature as not to be properly included under that term?"
On the one hand, Isaacs explained, arbitration might be viewed as a creature of
private contract, with arbitrators as the parties' agents and instruments of their
will. On the other hand, as a system for binding adjudication of disputes by
independent decisionmakers, arbitration invited comparisons to court trials.
Isaacs concluded that one's perspective on many practical and legal questions
confronting parties, arbitrators, courts, and legislatures hinges on the "more or
less subconscious" categorization of arbitration as an instrumentality of contract
or court substitute.
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization ofArbitration, 92 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Isaacs, Two Views, supra note 57, at 929) (footnote omitted).
125. See Isaacs, Two Views, supra note 57, at 940-41. Wesley Sturges wrote to Isaacs
in 1930 to voice similar concerns of the role of lawyers in the arbitration process: "As
lawyers take on the management of arbitrations, more and more will the process not be a
simple one." Letter from Wesley Sturges to Nathan Isaacs (Nov. 24, 1930) (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 2, File:
Correspondence Re: Articles and Books, 1930).
126. Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 126 n.17 (2002) (citing Isaacs, Two Views, supra
note 57, at 934-35). Professor Schmitz acknowledges the prophetic nature of Isaacs
commentary: "His concerns remain true today." Id.
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shortly after the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925,127
has largely been accepted.128
Space has not permitted an exhaustive review of Isaacs's
many contributions to legal scholarship. However, this brief
review shows the magnitude of his contributions. The next Part
will more fully examine CLR and Isaacs's cycle theory of legal
development, both of which were significantly influenced by
Jewish law.
IV. CONSERVATIVE LEGAL REALISM
AND THE JEWISH LEGAL TRADITION
Isaacs's insights were not cloaked in theoretical
nomenclature,129 and his vein of CLR was not as sexy as the more
radical insights of Llewellyn 3 o and Frank."' Theoretical or not,
radical or not, his insights into the actual working out of law in a
cyclical evolutionary path were important contributions to legal
realism and modern legal theory. His writings provide insights
into the law from both critical and developmental perspectives.
Many of the ideas he nurtured are still relevant to modern legal
theory, as well as being foundational in disparate areas of law
such as contracts, sales, arbitration, torts, and trust law. Isaacs's
position as a proto-realist informs the intellectual offerings of
other proto-realists like Pound, Corbin, Hale, and Hohfeld, as
well as the realists of the 1930s, including Karl Llewellyn and
Morris and Felix Cohen. Isaacs's focus on the functionality of law
remains an important part of legal scholarship.3 2 Hohfeldian
jurisprudence details the breaking down of legal concepts from
abstract generalizations to concrete, workable duties.'"' This
127. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1926).
128. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining that prearbitration litigation would frustrate the very purpose
of the FAA). In recognition of his scholarship, the American Arbitration Association
invited Isaacs to become a member of its Board of Directors. Letter from Lucius Eastman,
Chairman of the Bd. of the Am. Arbitration Ass'n, to Nathan Isaacs (Feb. 22, 1940) (on
file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File:
Correspondence, 1935-1940).
129. Professor Horwitz labeled Isaacs as "the original and penetrating torts-contracts
scholar." HORwiTZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 183.
130. See Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1222-26 (responding to Dean
Pound's critique of legal realism).
131. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
132. But see Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57-60
(1984) (criticizing the idea that law is functional).
133. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as




decomposition of legal abstraction is at the heart of Isaacs's
analysis.'3 4 The rest of this Part will place Isaacs's scholarship in
the context of American legal realism, examine the connection
between his brand of CLR and modern legal theory, and analyze
the relationship between Jewish law and his theory of legal
development.
A. American Legal Realism
Legal realism is often associated with two well-analyzed
insights. First, the radical form of legal realism, more recently
associated with CLS, questions the law's ability to provide
determinate, unbiased answers to legal disputes."' This rule
skepticism is the most noted characteristic of the legal realist
scholarship of the 1930s.'36 This is also the idea that the CLS
movement of the 1970s and 1980s further radicalized to question
the very legitimacy of the legal order.17 Critics of the realists
feared the nihilistic and lawless implications of such theorizing,
but it is doubtful that many of the legal realists actually intended
to assault the underlying legitimacy of law."' As discussed
earlier, Isaacs's CLR attempted to merge the indeterminacy of
the dynamic nature of law with its disaggregated conceptual
core. The second major insight of the legal realists was the need
for an interdisciplinary analysis of law and legal practice. It is
this insight that connects legal realism to the modern LAE
134. See Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 39 n.19 (Isaacs
"gratefully" adopted Hohfeld's eight fundamental legal conceptions). Duncan Kennedy has
suggested that the search by Isaacs and other like-minded figures for the governing
functional interest of a legal relation was "very similar to the principles of classical legal
thought, or similar at least in that the trick is to find a governing interest for a domain
and then implement it." Kennedy, supra note 65, at 120.
135. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 64-65 (Martin P. Golding & William A-
Edmundson eds., 2005).
136. The legal formalists of the early 1900s believed "that judges decide cases on the
basis of distinctively legal rules and reasons." It is this type of formalism that the legal
realists attacked. Id. at 50.
137. Id. at 64-65.
138. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 1, at 49-52 (detailing the realism
movement's origins and the clash over the meaning of the movement); WILLIAM TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 81 (1973) (describing the tremendous
confusion within academia of the meaning of realism); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 840-42 (1935) (attacking
formalist legal logic but also calling for the assessment of "conflicting human values"). But
see FRANK, supra note 131, at 32-41 (delivering radical criticisms of the judicial
decisionmaking); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 110 (1930) (distinguishing the
concept of law from that of order); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The
Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929)
(explaining the role of intuition in judicial decisionmaking).
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movement. Isaacs's Ph.D. in economics and immersion into legal
history provided a knowledge base for his broad contextual view
of law and the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to
legal study. Isaacs's CLR will be more fully explored in the next
Part.
B. Conservative Legal Realism and Modern Legal Theory
The CLR strain of legal realism plays a major role in modem
legal theory. The connection between legal realism and various
schools of legal thought, such as CLS, law and society, and LAE,
has been well documented elsewhere."' However, the
relationship between the work of Isaacs and modern legal
thought has not been adequately analyzed. Understanding
Isaacs's insights can help us better comprehend the meaning and
influence of the LRM and its intellectual descendents.
Professor Horwitz has argued that LAE's general alignment
with political conservatism lacks precedent from within the
original legal realist tradition.4 0 One of the forerunners of legal
realism, Roscoe Pound, became a conservative41 and was
criticized by the realists of the 1930s for not going far enough
with his realist insights.142  However, Robert Gordon has
suggested that the general affiliation of legal formalism with
political conservatism and legal realism with political liberalism
is "only an accident of our recent history" and that "[iut is easy to
imagine a radical formalism, such as the French Revolution's
program to remake society in accordance with abstract legal
139. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 13 (2001). Critical
Legal Studies was "[i]n major part .. . a revival of legal realism in an uncompromisingly
radical form ... . The critical scholars claimed that law is nothing but politics." Id. at 13.
"[Tihe legal realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s advocated not only greater
psychological realism (Jerome Frank) and economic realism (Karl Llewellyn, William 0.
Douglas) about the law but also large-scale empirical research as the path of law reform."
Id. at 3.
140. See HORwiTZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 269-71.
141. See KALMAN, supra note 2, at 45-62 (discussing Pound's move from realism to
conservatism). Compare Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence 1, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911) (identifying the predecessors and origins of
sociological jurisprudence), and Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence II, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1911) (exploring the relation of sociological
jurisprudence with various philosophical theories), and Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence III, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) (concluding
Pound's study of sociological jurisprudence by explaining that sociological jurists look at
the workings of the law, its social purposes, and the best means of furthering social
concepts), with Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697
(1931) (critiquing new juristic realists).
142. See, e.g., HULL, POUND AND LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 283 ("[The acuity of
Pound's intellectual vision faltered. . . .").
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rights, or a conservative Realism, such as German historicism."'"
Isaacs embodied a brand of conservative realism present among
the American legal academics of the 1920s and 1930s.
The recognition of a conservative strain of legal realism puts
into perspective a long-standing dispute over the historic
pedigree of legal realism and CLS. This Article suggests a
resolution of this debate by establishing that there was a CLR
strand of realism that embraced a conservative moral and
political valence, while also advocating social scientific studies
and recognizing the socially contingent nature of law. In the end,
CLR recognizes the contingent nature of law but insists that such
contingency is limited by moral, political, and cultural values
that are essentially conservative. Professor Horwitz rejects the
proposition that legal realism rested upon conservative values.
He contests the assertion that because legal realism and LAE
"both share an instrumentalist and consequentialist approach to
law" they are both based upon a conservative ideology.'" Horwitz
argues that the social science embraced by the realists was value-
laden and intertwined with a progressive political ideology that
is incompatible with LAE's embrace of a purportedly value-free
economic social science.'45 The thesis here is that Isaacs's strain
of CLR is more aligned with modern LAE than with the generally
held view of 1930s legal realism. Horwitz may be right regarding
the linkage between RLR and CLS,'4 6 but his argument loses
weight when comparing CLR to CLS.
Richard Posner has chastised legal realism for its liberalism,
irresponsibility, and its "naive enthusiasm for government."4
143. Gordon, supra note 132, at 66 n.18.
144. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 270.
145. Id.
146. This linkage has been challenged. See WOUTER DE BEEN, LEGAL REALISM
REGAINED: SAVING REALISM FROM CRITICAL ACCLAIM 76 (2008) (accusing Horwitz of
making distortions in finding this linkage).
147. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 393 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW] (advocating the "fusion" of liberalism, pragmatism, and economics in
law application); see RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 7-9 (2006) (arguing for a pragmatic approach to issues of
constitutional interpretation in relation to the war on terror); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3-4 (2003) (discussing legal pragmatism and its
application to law and policy); Richard A. Posner, Foreword to MICHAEL J. WHINCOP &
MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS xiv (2001); see also DE
BEEN, supra note 146, at 190 (observing that Posner has not been "keen to acknowledge
the Realists as his intellectual forebears"); Elisabeth Krecke, Economic Analysis and
Legal Pragmatism, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 427 (2003) (describing Judge Posner's
relationship to the concept that an invisible hand "drives the law toward efficiency").
Posner's pragmatism has been described as "an instrumentalist perspective which focuses
primarily on the practical consequences of legal rules, rather than on their doctrinal logic
and propriety." DE BEEN, supra note 146, at 197.
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However, Posner has acknowledged that he agrees with the
realists on "what to do-think things not words, trace the actual
consequences of legal doctrines, [and] balance competing
policies."'4 8 Posner's more recently espoused theory of
pragmatism is fully informed by legal realism."' Posner echoes
the realists' pragmatic commitment to social science when he
decries that contemporary law places "too much emphasis on
authority, certitude, rhetoric, and tradition, too little on
consequences and on social-scientific techniques for measuring
consequences.""o Isaacs's functionalist CLR and Posner's
pragmatic LAE both offer a pro-business and conservative social
vision of the American legal order."' Like the legal realists, and
anticipating Posner, Isaacs rejected the formalist view of law as a
science and instead advocated for an understanding of law as a
set of malleable tools that should be used to solve society's
problems. Politically, Isaacs was a conservative who believed in
free enterprise."' He thought that the law should use its tools to
assist businesspersons in their pursuit of economic gain. The
next section examines the Jewish legal tradition as it relates to
Isaacs's unified theory of law. Though Isaacs's economic views
were directly related to the business law specialty to which he
dedicated his academic career, Isaacs's religious views
undoubtedly played an even more fundamental role in shaping
his understanding of the legal dilemmas of his era.
C. Jewish Legal Tradition and Isaacs's Unified Theory of Law
There was a complex interaction between Isaacs's
understanding of secular and religious law. His writings on
Jewish and general legal subjects cannot be understood in
isolation. Isaacs's study of Jewish law was influenced by
contemporary currents in general legal thought. He investigated
Jewish law with the same scholarly approach in which he studied
148. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 147, at 393; see DE BEEN, supra note 146,
at 191 (suggesting that Posner could be considered a modem advocate of an "empirical
approach inspired by Legal Realism").
149. Thanks are due to Professor Jon Hanson for this observation.
150. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990).
151. See DE BEEN, supra note 146, at 200 ("There might be something wrong with the
content of Posner's substantive view, but from a Pragmatic perspective there is nothing
wrong with his commitment to a vision. It lends coherence and purpose to his Law and
Economics approach. There is a point to Posner's varied research projects . . . .").
152. Isaacs's friend Oko, himself a political liberal, believed that Isaacs "was no rebel
in politics. He was conservative. Not that he chose to stand in the zone of caution. His
temper was not that of a reformer, but he was ready to consider every change upon its
merits." Oko, Memorial Address, supra note 13, at 2.
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other legal traditions, and his conclusions sometimes radically
differed from traditional understandings.' Simultaneously,
Isaacs's academic contributions to secular legal thought were
influenced by his study of Jewish law. Though Isaacs was notably
reticent about his innermost convictions,15 4 his conservatism
reflected his lifestyle and intellectual commitments as an
observant Jew.
Jewish law served as a paradigm for other systems of law in
Isaacs's mind. Adolph Oko noted that Isaacs was "fascinated by
universal legal ideas" and held the belief that Jewish law was a
living, growing law."' Isaacs did not see the Jewish people or
their law as sui generis." He recognized that the tension
between tradition and innovation in Jewish law was a
characteristic of civil and common law legal systems."' Isaacs
laid out his unified understanding of Jewish law and secular law
in a two-part article: "The Law" and the Law of Change.' In
that article, he sketched the cycles in the history of Jewish law
and extrapolated them to secular law. His knowledge of the
Jewish and civil law legal systems enabled him to place Anglo-
American law in a broader context."' He claimed that the Jewish
153. Oko eulogized Isaacs as "a convinced Jew, and orthodox." Oko, Memorial
Address, supra note 13, at 1. However, Oko quickly added that Isaacs was "no
'fundamentalist,' biblical or rabbinic" and that "[iun Nathan Isaacs intelligence and
orthodoxy met in a new embrace." Id.
154. One of his assistants recounted that Isaacs "was always happy to discuss
problems of religious history, theory and practice; but concerning his religious feelings
and convictions he was always silent. Here his feelings were too deep, too personal for
conversation." Freiberg, supra note 29, at 6.
155. Oko, Memorial Address, supra note 13, at 1. See generally Oko & Isaacs, supra
note 34, at 73-85 (calling for the writing of a history of Jewish Law).
156. See generally Nathan Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World: A Study in
Historic Fact and Fiction, 6 MENORAH J. 258, 262 (1920) [hereinafter Isaacs, Jewish Law
in the Modern World] ("Jews are a part of the human family and have all the traits of the
human family, and that their experiences and reactions are accordingly both natural and
interesting.").
157. See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Influence of Judaism on Western Law: A Gift
Inter Vivos, in THE LEGACY OF ISRAEL 377, 397-406 (Edwyn R. Bevan & Charles Singer
eds., 1927) [hereinafter Isaacs, Influence of Judaism on Western Law] (describing the
relationship between the solution of Jewish problems and the improvement of general law
and the relationship of the Jewish experience under western law). Some of his close
associates wrote shortly after his death that Isaacs "saw in Jewish sacred law the
foundation of his legal studies, since it is there that he found the higher purposes of
Jurisprudence contemplated or attained." Letter from Ben M. Selekman, Executive Dir. of
Associated Jewish Philanthropies, to Ella Isaacs, Nathan Isaacs's Widow (Apr. 8, 1942)
(on file with American Jewish Historical Society) (discussing the resolution adopted by
the Board of Trustees of the Associated Jewish Philanthropies at its meeting on March 9,
1942).
158. Isaacs, Law of Change II, supra note 62; Isaacs, Law of Change I, supra note 63.
159. See Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 11, at 786 nn.40-44 (providing an
analysis of the general character of Nathan Isaacs's writings and career).
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and Anglo-American legal systems shared many essential
attributes.' Isaacs's cycle theory was an attempt to discover
universal principles of law while allowing for constant change in
the content of the law. He asserted that those changes are
accomplished through a predictable set of means that correlate to
the different but recurring stages of how lawyers approach their
legal system.''
This cycle theory of jurisprudence was a direct outgrowth of
the internal debate between Reform and Orthodox Jews over
Jewish law. Isaacs conceived his theory of legal cycles to support
a traditional understanding of Jewish law against the attacks of
Reform Judaism, even as he embraced the changing nature of the
law. 62 Isaacs asserted that the difference between his own
moderate traditionalism and the Reform faction was "not a
question of change vs. no change; it is rather a question of the
mode and manner of development."' Rabbi Dr. Adolf Biichler,6 4
the principal of Jews' College, an English Orthodox seminary,
questioned Isaacs's description of the Reform movement as a
natural product of Jewish history.'6 5 In response to the similar
criticism that he was legitimizing the Reform movement by
acknowledging change in Jewish law, Isaacs affirmed that while
the Reform movement had historical antecedents, he believed
that the cultural assimilation of Reform Jews would prevent the
Reform movement from making a permanent contribution to
Jewish tradition.166
He used insights taken from the historical development of
Jewish law to inform his theory of legal development and
160. Nathan Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence: Their Places in History and Their
Present Alignment: The Quarrels of the "Schools," 31 HARV. L. REV. 373, 409-10 (1918)
(comparing the universal elements in grammar between two different languages and in
jurisprudence between the two different legal traditions).
161. Nathan Isaacs, Preface to Untitled Book 1-4 (n.d.) (on file with Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 4, File: Chapters in books possibly
published, undated).
162. See Nathan Isaacs, Notes on Fiction, Equity and Legislation in the Development
of Jewish Jurisprudence, 1 JEWISH F. 600, 601-02 (1918) [hereinafter Isaacs, Notes on
Fiction]; Nathan Isaacs, Orthodoxy and Reform 4 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Material
removed from Volume 1, 1919-1930).
163. Isaacs, Notes on Fiction, supra note 162, at 601.
164. See RAPHAEL PATAI, THE JEWS OF HUNGARY: HISTORY, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY
400 (1996). (describing the Rabbi's education and professional career).
165. See Letter from A. BUchler to Nathan Isaacs (Oct. 6, 1919) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Material removed
from Volume 1, 1919-1930) ("The negative attitude of the [nineteenth] century
reformers .. . does not seem to fit in with the natural stages of development.").
166. Isaacs, Notes on Fiction, supra note 162, at 601-02.
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stressed that, in the realm of Jewish law, legal doctrines were
mere tools that should be adapted as dictated by the moral goals
of the law."' It is striking that just as in the realm of commercial
law, Isaacs advocated for a functional approach in Jewish law
while simultaneously insisting upon the integrity of its
traditional common-law-like process.
Much of Isaacs's scholarship worked to resolve the challenge
of recognizing that law adapts to the changing needs of society
while continuing to insist that the law was not simply
opportunistic. His worldview saw law as serving a relatively fixed
moral end, even when the law changes to respond to different
historical conditions. He thought that Jewish law evolved to
serve human needs, but also that it contained timeless
principles." A Talmudic story about the equitable Rabbi Hillel
(c. 110 BCE-10 CE) and his more conservative contemporary
Rabbi Shammai inspired Isaacs.' 9 A Gentile offered to convert to
Judaism if Shammai would teach him the whole Law on one foot.
An indignant Shammai chased the scoffer away. When the
sarcastic Gentile presented the same offer to Hillel, he replied
"[w]hat is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: that is the
whole [Law], while the rest is the commentary thereof: go and
learn it."',
7o
Because of his belief in the dynamic nature of law, Isaacs
rejected the "simple account of Revelation" that the entire
Torah was given de novo by God at Mount Sinai.'7 Instead, he
argued that "the great mystery of 'revelation' must be
approached as an incident in the life of the law-an incident
involving selection, rejection, purification, but not creation."172
At the turn of the twentieth century, Higher Biblical Criticism
rested in part on the presumption that law always evolved in a
steady ethical progression which could be discerned by the
167. See Nathan Isaacs, The Place of Law in Jewish Education, UNITED SYNAGOGUE
RECORDER, Mar. 1926, at 2, 2-3 (advocating the functional approach to teaching Jewish
law).
168. Isaacs saw Jewish law as "practical guidance in the art of right living." Nathan
Isaacs, The Great Preamble-A Rereading of Genesis, in THE JEWISH LIBRARY, SECOND
SERIES 232 (Leo Jung ed., 1930) [hereinafter Isaacs, Great Preamble].
169. See Isaacs, The Law of Change II, supra note 62, at 752-53.
170. BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SHABBATH 31(a) (Rabbi I. Epstein ed., Rabbi H.
Freedman trans., The Soncino Press 1972) (footnote omitted).
171. Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, supra note 156, at 262.
172. Nathan Isaacs, The Common Law of the Bible: Elements from Much Earlier
Periods of Legal Development Which Underlie and Are Unconsciously Presupposed in




Prophets from the different codes found in the Bible.13 Isaacs
believed that such a presumption was untenable. He asserted
that such a juristic theory encourages a revisionist view of
history in relation to the interpretation of canonical texts. 74 The
framing of legal change through the prism of progressive
evolution biases the interpreter toward a revisionist view of
history in order to confirm the legal-ethical progression.17 ' At the
same time, Isaacs also rejected a fundamentalist understanding of
the Bible. Biblical fundamentalists believe that God's intent can be
discerned from a literal reading of holy texts. In contrast,
nonfundamentalist Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and Muslims
interpret the Bible through the lenses of tradition, doctrine, and
precedent.617 In rejecting "Jewish fundamentalism," he argued that
the Pentateuch was primarily a Law Book in which the nonlegal
parts are auxiliary.'77 He insisted that there is a strand of Judaism
that is zealously observant but still embraced the Law's dynamic
nature. Modern Orthodox Rabbi Leo Jung"' eulogized that
"Nathan Isaacs was universally beloved because he was not
confined to any contemporary scene nor exclusive in sympathy for
any particular group."7 1
Isaacs condemned the classification of Jews as "Reform" or
"Orthodox" as being deceptive and destructive.o As matters
173. See generally Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 949, 950 (1932)
(reviewing J.M. POWIs SMITH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREw LAW (1931))
(suggesting that the doctrine of "higher criticism" dictates that legislation arise out of
existing conditions and that the Bible borrows from the Hammurabi Code).
174. See id. at 950-51 ("It is almost grotesque to pick out from a cluster of laws found
incorporated in an account of revelation, in a homily, or in a prophetic vision, details for
comparison with the businesslike orders inscribed on a stone for the instruction of
citizens.").
175. Isaacs sarcastically noted, in relation to Jewish and English law, that:
[I]f we were to go through the whole body of English law and forcibly "date" each
paragraph by reference to such a juristic theory, throwing out alleged "later
additions" and other intractable matter and liberally amending our texts, we
might build up a body of learning on the basis of which a later writer could
develop a simple history of English law that would concur exactly with our
previous job of dating by internal evidence, and we should end with the same
hypothesis ....
Id. at 951 (footnote omitted); see also Isaacs, Common Law of the Bible, supra note 172, at
117 (claiming that a knowledge of the development of unwritten law takes the sting out of
turn of the twentieth century Higher Biblical Criticism).
176. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGINS
OF RIGHTS 111-12 (2004).
177. Isaacs, Great Preamble, supra note 168, at 232.
178. See Leo Jung, The Path of a Pioneer: Autobiography of Leo Jung, in THE JEWISH
LIBRARY 8 (1980).
179. Leo Jung, Eulogy Delivered at the Nathan Isaacs Memorial Service at the Hebrew
Teachers College (Feb. 22, 1942) (on file with the American Jewish Historical Society).
180. See Nathan Isaacs, Jewish Sects and Factions in America, 5 JEWISH F. 8 (1922).
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stood in 1922, Isaacs argued that "the labels are not only lies;
they are an absolute menace" because they imposed ideological
classifications which prevented people from thinking for
themselves and hampered recognition of the more significant
divisions between observance and non-observance."' Isaacs's
belief in a variant of Modern Orthodox or Conservative
Judaism allowed him to formulate a universal theory of legal
cycles and to search for new principles to anchor evolving
law. 82 He blended the negative critique of the legal order
associated with the legal realists with a positive theory of legal
development.
Isaacs considered radical change in the law as a sign of its
continuing vitality rather than its capriciousness. At the same
time, Isaacs's work was premised on a faith that it was possible
to formulate objective principles in both Jewish and secular law
in order to further moral goals. The LRM was a radicalization of
the realist insights offered by Roscoe Pound and Nathan Isaacs.
In the end, Isaacs's realist-conservative view allowed him to
reject the New Deal political agenda shared by most of the
realists, while retaining his legal realist commitments to
studying the law in practice and to a pragmatic, nonliteralistic
jurisprudence. Isaacs's functional method at the core of his CLR,
and its relationship to legal realism and Jewish law, will be more
fully examined in the next Part.
181. Id. at 16.
182. Isaacs understood and sympathized with Jewish students attempting to deal
with the demands of Jewish law and culture in a secular university setting. He wrote to
Menorah Chancellor Henry Hurwitz that:
You know as well as I do . . . what indelible scars the struggle of that
transition [between traditional Jewish scholarship and American academia]
has left on many of our contemporaries. They deserve our pity and have it, too,
in spite of the awful things they perpetuate. I am reminded of the Talmudic
story of the Four that entered the Garden [of esoteric philosophy]. One died,
one lost his mind, one became a heretic and only one entered in peace and
departed again in peace. The same general proposition obtains today among
bechurim [young yeshiva students] who gain admittance to American graduate
schools.
RITTERBAND & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 147 (second alteration in original). Isaacs,
though he had never attended a Yeshiva, may have had himself in mind as someone
who had seamlessly merged his secular and Jewish studies. Isaacs thought the
transition of traditional Judaism to American life had created schisms in American
Judaism. However, he was confident that eventually a moderate approach would arise
combining the strengths of Jewish and American traditions. Louis Hurwich, Professor
Nathan Isaacs, JEWISH ADvoc., Feb. 20, 1942 (on file with American Jewish Historical
Society) (Acting Dean of Hebrew Teachers College and Superintendent Bureau of
Jewish Education recounting the theme of a series of Hebrew lectures Isaacs had
delivered at Boston's Hebrew Teachers College).
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V. ISAACS, THE FUNCTIONAL METHOD, AND JEWISH LAW
This Part will examine the roots of Isaacs's realist or
functional approach to the law. Isaacs relied upon the legal
realist insights to both facilitate business transactions and to
defend Judaism.'" Isaacs's functionalism bridged the intellectual
divide between the importance of teaching doctrine and
critiquing that doctrine; between general principles and
transaction-specific rules; and between legal formalism and
radical realism." The first section reviews the role of Jewish law
in Isaacs's functional analysis. He saw in the Jewish case law or
responsa" evidence of the dynamic nature of a supposedly fixed
law. He used this knowledge of Jewish law to inform his legal
realism and to frame his cycle theory of legal development.'8 6 The
second section analyzes the application of his insights taken from
the study of Jewish law to develop a CLR critique of American
law. This section will also analyze his promotion of an
interdisciplinary approach to law study, the relationship of
Isaacs's scholarship to Llewellynian thought, and his critique of
Hohfeldian conceptualism.
A. Isaacs's Functionalism and Jewish Law
Isaacs's insight that Jewish law was a dynamic, living law
that was responsive to moral and ethical concerns forged his
commitment to a functional law. He applied this living law
concept to the evolution of law in general and more specifically to
the American legal system.' He argued that Jewish life
continually developed the Halakah" through application to novel
183. See Letter from Isaacs [Jurist] to Oko [the Bookman] 3 (n.d.) (on file with Jacob
Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers,
Box 8, File 3).
184. Felix Cohen believed that "functionalism represents an assault upon all dogmas
and devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual experience." Cohen, supra note
138, at 822. He also remarked that "[ilf the functionalists are correct, the meaning of a
definition is found in its consequences." Id. at 838.
185. Responsa refers to the written answers of Rabbis to questions regarding Jewish
law that arise in practice. David Hollander, Jewish Law for the Law Librarian, 98 LAW
LIBR. J. 219, 233-34 (2006).
186. See supra Part IV.C (describing Jewish legal tradition and Isaacs's unified
theory of law).
187. Isaacs disagreed with the view that Jewish law became rigid and formalistic
after biblical times. One of those who held that view was famed legal sociologist Eugen
Ehrlich. Isaacs accused him of falling into the trap of believing that current Jewish law
had become fixed. See Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, supra note 156, at 263-64
(discussing some common misunderstandings of Rabbinic Law).
188. Halakah is the traditional Hebrew term for Jewish law, literally meaning the
"path." MICHAEL L. SATLOW, CREATING JUDAISM: HISTORY, TRADITION, PRACTICE 156 (2006).
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situations."' The Talmud was used creatively in practice to deal
with novel issues. Isaacs used a Jewish legal concept, hazakah,
as an example of the dynamic nature of Jewish law. In the
Middle Ages, Jews would not compete with one another for
housing rentals. Jewish practice held that it was improper to
offer a higher rental amount for a residence occupied by another
Jew. There was no explicit rule in the Talmud that dealt with
this issue. However, some Rabbis found authority for the practice
in the Talmudic principle that if a poor man is turning a cake in
preparation to eating it, he who takes it from him is wicked.9 o In
this example, Jewish tenants came to respect "each other's
tenant-right, or hazakah.""' Isaacs saw this as an example of
Jewish law acting in the spirit of Pound's social engineering
vision of law.'92 Isaacs's research on the practice of hazakah was
cited in briefs supporting the constitutionality of rent-control
laws in the New York Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme
Court. 93
189. Nathan Isaacs, Introduction of Professor Ginzberg, Zunz Lecturer 3-4 (Dec. 29,
1920) (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives,
Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 2).
190. BABYLONIAN TALMUD: KIDDUSHIN 59a (Rabbi I. Epstein ed., Rabbi H. Freedman
trans., The Soncino Press 1972).
191. Isaacs, Influence of Judaism on Western Law, supra note 157, at 403.
192. For Isaacs, the "law" was "put to the test in this as in hundreds of other
details in the Middle Ages." Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, supra note 156,
at 264.
193. When the constitutionality of the first New York rent control laws was
challenged in the New York Court of Appeals and then in the U.S. Supreme Court, Julius
Henry Cohen, one of the lawyers defending the legislation for the Joint Legislative
Committee on Housing of the New York Legislature, was aided by an article written by
Isaacs in the Menorah Journal. Isaacs, Jewish Law in the Modern World, supra note 156.
Isaacs also translated an Italian study of the subject for Cohen. Julius Henry Cohen, Book
Review, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 604 n.2 (1922) (reviewing EDGAR J. LAUER & VICTORE
HOUSE, THE TENANT AND His LANDLORD (1921)). Cohen believed that the rent control law
would be upheld if the judges were weaned "away from the prevailing lawyers' bias
against the laws" by bringing the history of Jewish law and Parliamentary laws that
regulated rents in Ireland into play. JULIUs HENRY COHEN, THEY BUILDED BETTER THAN
THEY KNEw 170 (1946). Cohen relied upon these arguments before the New York Court of
Appeals; his arguments resulted in the court opinion joined by then-Judge Cardozo. See
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 130 N.E. 923, 923 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that the rent
regulations were constitutional). These historical precedents, or at least the British ones,
were effective. Cohen successfully defended the wisdom of the laws during oral argument
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Edgar Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
Cohen, supra, at 606. In the companion case to Siegel, Justice Holmes stressed in the
majority opinion that "[tihe preference given to the tenant in possession . .. is traditional
in English law." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921). However, it was probably more
important for Holmes that the rent law purported to be a temporary emergency measure.
Id. In contrast, Holmes would shortly thereafter void as a taking the permanent
Pennsylvania statute which made it illegal for coal companies to cause the subsidence of
public buildings, streets, or any private home. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413-14 (1922).
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Isaacs's belief in the ability of the common law to adjust
itself to meet modern problems was borne out of his study of
Jewish responsa. He saw the adaptive qualities of Jewish law as
evidence of "the Halakah as a living institution."94 He believed
that studying the method of law application represented by the
responsa system would result in a better understanding of the
common law system both descriptively and prescriptively."' The
study of Jewish law was important not only for a better historical
understanding of legal change but also in the quest for legal
reform.
B. Isaacs's Functionalism and the Legal Realist Movement
Isaacs's research methodology, influenced by his position at
Harvard Business School, focused on how law adapted in response
to changing social and economic problems. He helped develop a
functional approach to law study."' Carol Weisbrod noted that his
work centered on a nonformalistic, business-oriented vision of the
law.' Commercial law, Isaacs argued, should be organized
through the perspective of a businessperson's problem-solving
orientation.9 s This functional, or problem-oriented, approach was
an attempt to discuss legal concepts in their actual business
context rather than through the lens of contract doctrine."
194. Letter from Nathan Isaacs to Adolph S. Oko (Feb. 5, 1923) (on file with Jacob
Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers,
Box 8, File 2).
195. Isaacs, Influence of Judaism on Western Law, supra note 157, at 405-06.
Isaacs's dream is closer to fulfillment today due to the availability of tools such as the
computerized Global Jewish Database (The Responsa Project). See Judaic Responsa,
http://www.biu.ac.il/JH/Responsa (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (listing an advertisement for
the Online Responsa Project). Isaacs systematically built up an impressive Judaica
collection of an estimated 10,000 bound volumes and 1,000 pamphlets. The collection was
especially strong in the fields of Jewish thought, bibliography, and law. The library
included many valuable and rare early printed editions of responsa and other Jewish
works. Adolph S. Oko, The Nathan Isaacs Jewish Collection (n.d.) (on file with Jacob
Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers,
Box 9, File 12). The bulk of the Nathan Isaacs Library is now in the possession of the
Chaim Berlin Yeshiva in Brooklyn, N.Y.
196. See Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 328, 329 (1926) (reviewing
RALPH STANLEY BAUER & ESSEL RAY DILLAvOu, CASES ON BUSINESS LAw (1925))
(approving of the growing use of the functional approach in books on business law).
197. See Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 11, at 786 n.40 (discussing Isaacs's focus
as a legal academic in a business school rather than a law school).
198. For Isaacs, the "law is made for such realities as business and not business for
the law." Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 25 ILL. L. REV. 114, 116 (1930) (reviewing WILLIAM
H. SPENCER, A TEXTBOOK ON LAw AND BUSINESS (1929)) [hereinafter Isaacs, reviewing
SPENCER].
199. Isaacs took a leading role in spreading the approach in business schools. See
John D. Donnell, Business Law Textbooks: A Retrospective Exploration, 22 AM. BUS. L.J.
265, 270-71 (1984) (discussing Isaacs's use of the "functional approach" in his textbooks).
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Isaacs explained that his approach was a product of "the
theories of the more recent schools that consider the law as a
social phenomenon with a social function."2 00 As a disciple of Dean
Pound, Isaacs studied the works of Eugen Ehrlich.20' Ehrlich's
concept of "living law," sometimes characterized as the
divergence between book law and the law in practice, influenced
Isaacs's thinking on law creation and development. In 1924,
Isaacs suggested that the Harvard Law School faculty participate
in a Seminar of Living Law in order to study this dichotomy and
to develop a functionalist method of law study.2 02
Another influential scholar who helped develop the
functional approach was Herman Oliphant of Columbia Law
School.202 The link between Oliphant and Isaacs sheds new light
on the origins of the legal realist conception of law as a tool to
serve business. Isaacs and Oliphant had attended a 1914
conference in which the term "functional approach" was first
used.204 In 1927, the American Federation of Labor recruited
Oliphant to help write a landmark Brandeis brief in opposition to
yellow-dog contracts that forbade employees from joining a
union.20 ' The Interborough Rapid Transit Company required
200. Nathan Isaacs, The Teaching of Law in Collegiate Schools of Business, 28 J.
POL. ECON. 113, 123 (1920). He was referring to Roscoe Pound's sociological school. Isaacs
declared that "the leadership of the world in juristic thinking" had passed "pretty clearly"
to Pound. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 22 MICH. L. REV. 394, 394 (1924) (reviewing
ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923)); see also Nathan Isaacs,
Business Security and Legal Security, 37 HARV. L. REV. 201, 213 n.15 (1923) [hereinafter
Isaacs, Business Security].
201. Isaacs, Business Security, supra note 200, at 213 n.15 (citing Eugen Ehrlich, The
Sociology of Law, 36 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130 (Nathan Isaacs trans., 1922)).
202. This idea was inspired by Ehrlich's course of the same title, which had
investigated the differences that had developed between European statutory law and the
actual legal practices of specific regions. Isaacs wrote that though he was personally
pursuing this line of research he had no desire "to monopolize the field." See
Memorandum from Nathan Isaacs to Curriculum Comm. of Harvard Law Sch. 3 (Mar. 25,
1924) (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1,
File: HBS Memorandum related to Law School Conference, 25 March 1924) (following up
informal conference with Curriculum Committee of Law School). Unfortunately, the legal
formalist Harvard Law faculty apparently rejected the proposal. However, Isaacs was
able to institute a joint program between the Harvard Business School and the Yale Law
School with similar aims. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
dual-degree program initiated between Harvard and Yale).
203. Isaacs, Business Security, supra note 200, at 213 n.15 (citing Herman Oliphant,
Studies of the Operation ofRules of Law, 9 A.B.A. J. 497 (1923)).
204. Isaacs later recalled that at the path-breaking meeting of business law teachers,
"some one [sic] hit upon the adjective 'functional' to describe a new approach to the law for
the business student." Isaacs, reviewing SPENCER, supra note 198, at 115; see also Nathan
Isaacs, The Merchant and His Law, 23 J. POL. ECON. 529, 556 n.1 (1915) (reporting that
Oliphant had independently already begun experimenting with the functional method in
Chicago).
205. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
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employees to sign such a contract as a precondition to
employment.2 06 Oliphant solicited Isaacs to provide his expertise
of standardized contracts in the drafting of the brief.207 In his
response, Isaacs noted that the marked disparity in bargaining
power was the key factor in the labor-management
relationship.2 08 The Brandeis brief became a storehouse of
information and arguments that were relied upon by the drafters
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.209 The functional approach argued,
in this instance, for the necessity of collective bargaining
agreements in order to equalize the disparity of bargaining
power.21 Realism would become associated with the idea that
power plays a key role not only in private contracting but also in
the choice to regulate or not regulate the private sphere.
In 1921, Isaacs co-authored a casebook entitled The Law in
Business Problems with Lincoln Frederick Schaub of the Harvard
Business School.2 1' This was the first casebook to attempt a
functional, rather than doctrinal, treatment of commercial law. 212
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1409 & n.125 (1993) [hereinafter
Barenberg, Political Economy] (discussing the influence of legal realists on labor law
during the New Deal era).
206. See Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 227 N.Y.S. 258, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1928) (refusing to enforce the Interborough Rapid Transit Company's yellow-dog
contracts).
207. Oliphant wrote Isaacs that "[there is something to chuckle over in the origin of
the so-called 'functional approach,' isn't there?" The irony apparently being that the
functional approach was initially conceived as pro-business, while the lawsuit was
decidedly antibusiness. Letter from Herman Oliphant to Nathan Isaacs (Dec. 9, 1927) (on
file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File:
Correspondence, 1927).
208. See INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY AGAINST WILLIAM GREEN, ET AL,
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS 314 (1928) (noting that both courts and legislatures had
displayed a "well marked recognition of disparity in bargaining power" between employers
and employees).
209. The Act banned the labor injunction. Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers?
Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11
LAw & HIST. REV. 59, 78 (1993); see Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 205, at
1429 n.230 (stating that the briefs "principal sociological argument was that legal
obstruction of collective bargaining impeded collaborative, efficiency-enhancing shop
committees that could not succeed without the empowerment of autonomous unions").
210. See Barenberg, Political Economy, supra note 205, at 1421-22 (explaining that
the rise of unionization and collective bargaining was necessitated by the large scale of
corporate enterprises).
211. LINCOLN FREDERICK SCHAUB & NATHAN ISAACS, THE LAW IN BUSINESS
PROBLEMS: CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ASPECTS OF BUSINESS
(1921). The book was widely discussed and often criticized. See Grover C. Grismore, Book
Review, 35 HARV. L. REV. 218, 219 (1922); Charles A. Huston, Book Review, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 392, 392 (1922). But see Book Review, 55 AM. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1921) (stressing
the originality of the casebook). Isaacs would write an extensively revised second edition
in 1934. ISAACS, supra note 93.
212. See Donnell, supra note 199, at 271 (describing the functional, problem-centered
approach utilized in the casebook).
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The casebook asked questions such as "[d]oes the law help or
hinder or otherwise affect the process of engaging in business?"2 13
It juxtaposed topics unrelated doctrinally but that were
functionally alternative tools to deal with business problems.2 14
Isaacs aimed to discover the law in business practice, as well as
in the cases and statutes.2 1 5 Karl Llewellyn praised Isaacs's book
for emphasizing business facts and how law serves as a tool for
business.2 16 Isaacs and Schaub's book preceded the realist books
and approaches of Wesley A. Sturges's Credit Transactions and
Carrol Shanks's and William 0. Douglas's Management of
Business Units.2 17 The commonality of these functionalist-realist
books was the supplementation of "legal principles with life
situations."2 1 8 The radical-conservative realist distinction was
already apparent here. Grant Gilmore characterized the Sturges
book as nihilistic.2 In contrast, Isaacs's constructive approach
prefigured the eventual rationalization and unification of
213. SCHAUB & ISAACS, supra note 211, at vi.
214. For example, one part of the book, The Enforcement of Contracts, with Special
Reference to the Relation of Debtor and Creditor, dealt with the doctrinally diverse but
practically related topics of guaranty, mortgages, conditional sales, pledges, and
negotiable instruments. SCHAUB & ISAACS, supra note 211, at 357-525. This portion of the
book is further discussed in Donnell, supra note 199, at 271. The book, which at over 800
pages was short compared to its contemporaries, contains fewer and fewer editorial
comments as it progresses and becomes almost solely a collection of cases by its end. The
authors intended that students would become proficient at understanding cases without
the guidance of the authors as the school semester progressed. SCHAUB & ISAACS, supra
note 211, at vii.
215. See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Place of Business Law in the Curriculum of the
School of Business, in THE RONALD FORUM 13, 13-14 (n.d.) (on file with Baker Library
Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 4, File: The Place of Business Law in
the Curriculum of the School of Business, circa 1923) (describing the importance of
teaching business law in business schools).
216. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Modern Business Law Book, 32 YALE L.J. 299, 300
(1923) (reviewing SCHAUB & ISAACS, supra note 211, and other business law books).
Llewellyn declared that Isaacs's book, "[for] the lawyer, law teacher, and to the student
of social institutions," was "unquestionably the most valuable and suggestive single
volume of any of those under discussion." Id. at 304. However, Llewellyn thought that
the book was ill-suited for the business student. Id. Isaacs sought to change Llewellyn's
opinion, but to no avail. Letter from Karl Llewellyn to Nathan Isaacs (Sept. 5, 1923) (on
file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati,
Ohio).
217. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REV. 880, 881 (1931) (reviewing
WESLEY A. STURGES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CREDIT TRANSACTIONS (1930))
[hereinafter Isaacs, reviewing STURGES]; see WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS UNITS, at v (1931)
(stating that the goal of the text is "to show the recent trends in the law in addition to the
well established rules").
218. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 80.
219. He described the book as consisting "principally of the most absurd cases, along
with the most idiotic law review comments, which he had been able to find." GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 81 (1977).
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commercial law.220 In his preface to the 1934 edition of The Law
in Business Problems, Isaacs explained that the edition shifted
"emphasis from the study of 'laws' which change from year to
year and differ from state to state, to the study of 'the law' as an
institution of importance in business life."221 Rather than attempt
to teach business students the mechanics of legal doctrines, his
book aimed to elucidate the "uses-and the abuses" of legal
concepts "in the business world."22 2
A good example of Isaacs's pro-business functionalism is his
evaluation of the business trust. The common law's concept of a
business trust developed in the Massachusetts courts between
1910 and 1925.2 In 1929, Isaacs discussed the business trust in
Trusteeship in Modern Business224 and noted that "[floremost
among the advantages of trusteeship over the standardized legal
devices is its flexibility" due to its contractual nature.22 He also
observed that, unlike contract or corporate law, the trust concept
is needed in areas where relationships could not be governed
solely by the contract construct. 2 6 As Isaacs predicted, the
twentieth century saw the expansion of trust and fiduciary duty
law.227 The commonality and differences between Isaacs's CLR
220. See id. at 83-86 (describing Llewellyn's role in drafting the U.C.C. and the
restraining effect that conservative viewpoints had in limiting the inclusion of his more
radical ideas); Nathan Isaacs, The Economic Advantages and Disadvantages of the
Various Methods of Selling Goods on Credit, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 199, 199-200 (1923) (noting
the irrational and "puzzling" nature of the law of credit and advocating the development
of more rational rules). Isaacs called for lawyers as caretakers of business to look beyond
the doctrinal forms of security devices to their business function. Id. at 209; see also
Isaacs, Business Security, supra note 200, at 209 (contrasting the "the law in books and
the law in action as applied to realizing on securities in business" and noting a
substantial "gap" between those concepts).
221. ISAACS, supra note 93, at v.
222. Id. at v-vi.
223. HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BuSINEss ENTERPRISES 86 (2d ed. 1970).
224. Nathan Isaacs, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1048 (1929)
[hereinafter Isaacs, Trusteeship].
225. Id. at 1052.
226. Id. at 1060-61.
227. Tamar Frankel noted that "[tihe twentieth century is witnessing an
unprecedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law." Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983); see also Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary
Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 216 (1992) ("The
law of fiduciary duties continues to retain its elasticity."). Scholars have only recently
begun to follow Isaacs's footsteps by reassessing the pervasive role of the trust
organizational form in modem businesses. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation": A
Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 32 (citing Isaacs, Trusteeship, supra note 224,
at 1051-53, for the proposition that trusts played an important role in the organization of
business in the first part of the twentieth century and the advantage provided by the
flexibility of trusts); see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as
an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 182-85 (1997) (describing the flexibility
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and mainstream radical realism is discussed in the next three
subparts.
C. Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach
Isaacs aspired to study empirically the extent of the changes
in the use of contracts through time. Such a study would provide
a basis for understanding legal change and its relationship to
economic, political, and social life.2 8 He predicted that such
research would serve "as a corrective for an unhistorical use of
history" by those who thought that "each [legal] institution had a
single original purpose."229 He saw empirical research as a means
to uncover the underlying matrix of principles that supported
specific areas of law, such as contract and tort. This "uncovering"
would allow for a better understanding of law and its application
to novel situations. At the same time, Isaacs did not feel that the
functional approach should be the single means of teaching
law.2 0 This tension between functionality and guiding principles
is the underlying theme of CLR. CLR displays its realism by
stressing the importance of business facts to law application. The
conservative element of his CLR was premised on the belief in
the importance of a body of evolving, but stable, principles.
Under CLR, the centrality of doctrine and rules persists but is
integrated into a multi-disciplinary approach that views law as
being intertwined with society.
Isaacs sought to create an institutional framework for the
interdisciplinary study of business and law. In 1932, he wrote to
William 0. Douglas, then a Professor at Yale Law School, and
suggested an interchange of students between Harvard Business
School and Yale Law School. Eventually, they decided on a joint
in the trust fiduciary regime); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business
Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 568-69 (2003) (discussing
business trusts).
228. Isaacs, Appendix Technique, supra note 118, at 12-13.
229. Id. at 15.
230. Isaacs was apparently conflicted over whether the functional approach, which
was being strongly advocated for at Columbia Law School, was pedagogically
appropriate for law students, as opposed to business students. Isaacs doubted the
wisdom of abandoning the study of doctrine in law schools. He argued that "the
clustering of law courses around business facts rather than around legal principles tends
to result in a hodgepodge of legal points that offers no opportunity for the development of
principles." Isaacs, reviewing STURGES, supra note 217, at 881. Moreover, if the
functional approach appeared "more up to date it does so at the expense of making it to
the same extent ephemeral." Id.; cf WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE
EARLY YEARS 160 (1974) ("In credit transactions, we wanted to explore all the




dual-degree program.23' This attempt to integrate the two schools'
courses of study was the institutional embodiment of the realists'
ambition to "cross-fertiliz [e]" academic disciplines .232 The
233program was cancelled in 1938 due to lack of student interest.
Nonetheless, Isaacs was able to demonstrate his CLR approach
in a Yale Law School seminar course, in which, for example, he
traced the "economic repercussions" of the Pre-World War II
neutrality laws. Students in the course were required to write
papers on the "business realities of some particular" legal
relation."
D. Isaacs's Relationship with Llewellynian Thought
It is hard to read the works of Llewellyn in the area of
adhesion contracts without seeing the influence of Isaacs. A
Romantic School of German Jurisprudence that emphasized the
creative power of the Volk (people) in commercial law heavily
influenced Llewellyn. This predisposed Llewellyn to Isaacs's
conception of commercial law as a tool for business. These
influences resurfaced in Llewellyn's reliance on the custom of
businesspersons in writing the UCC."' Isaacs and Llewellyn
believed that business executives and lawyers should act as
caretakers of business and society, and that commercial law
should evolve from commercial practice.
The first evidence of Isaacs's influence on Llewellyn is when
Llewellyn, as editor in chief of the Yale Law Journal, wrote to
Isaacs that "[t]here have been few strictly legal articles published
in the past [few} years as interesting and stimulating" as The
Standardizing of Contracts.23 6 Professor Rakoff notes the
connection between Isaacs's scholarship and that of Llewellyn:
231. Letter from William 0. Douglas to Nathan Isaacs (July 20, 1932), in THE
DOUGLAS LETTERS 16 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987).
232. KALMAN, supra note 2, at 136.
233. Id.
234. Letter from Nathan Isaacs to John F. Meck, Jr., Yale Law Sch. (Oct. 26, 1938)
(on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File:
Yale Law School joint program, 1938). Isaacs also saw a need for more interdisciplinary
work on the interrelationship of business, law, and government. He was a founding
faculty member at the Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration,
later to become the Kennedy School of Government. See Mace, supra note 4, at 19
(describing Isaacs's professional accomplishments and his role at Harvard University).
235. See James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk- A Note on
Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156, 157-58
(1987).
236. Letter from Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law Journal, to
Nathan Isaacs (Jan. 21, 1919) (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard
Business School, Box 2, File: Correspondence regarding articles and books, 1917-1919).
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"From his earliest writings onward, Llewellyn, following the
work of Nathan Isaacs, stressed the fact that the law itself
provided parties with standardized institutions to serve as the
background for their own particular arrangements: the sale, the
pledge, the mortgage, and so forth."23 7 Notably, Llewellyn was
inspired by Isaacs's earlier extended horse-trader analogy when
he wrote his path-breaking articles Across Sales On Horseback...
and The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales.239 Earlier, Isaacs had
mocked the Sales Act of 1906 for being better suited for the
selling of a saddle to a horseman than for twentieth century
business transactions.2 40 Llewellyn, in What Price Contract?-An
Essay in Perspective,"' and Isaacs earlier in The Standardizing of
Contracts242 and Business Security and Legal Security,2" had
analyzed the possible ill effects of law on commerce. Both focused
on the antiquated rules relating to title, risk of loss, and
warranty law found in the Uniform Sales Act.2"
In promoting the need to modernize the law of sales through
codification, Isaacs used the notion of "delumping" concepts later
mastered by Llewellyn. 2" For Isaacs, "title no longer was a lump-
237. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1202 (1983). Llewellyn adopted Isaacs's argument that contracts should not be
reduced to formalistic doctrinal formula. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-
Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1262 & n.48 (1938).
238. Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939).
239. Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873
(1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Unhorse Sales].
240. Nathan Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser and the Sales Act, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
262, 263 (1934) [hereinafter Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser]; see Weisbrod, Way We Live,
supra note 11, at 789 & n.64 (citing Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 477 n.43 (1987) (suggesting
this possible influence)). Llewellyn acknowledged the stimulus Isaacs's writings provided
to Llewellyn, Unhorse Sales, supra note 239, at 904. Llewellyn also discussed Isaacs's
insight that merchant-buyer and consumer-buyer transactions needed different types of
warranties. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
699, 721 & n.72 (1936) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Warranty of Quality 1] (probably referring
to, though not directly citing, Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser, supra, at 262). Llewellyn
also cited to Isaacs in his casebook and in his discussion of a balanced standardized
contract which he would later attempt to incorporate into the U.C.C. KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 51 (1930); Llewellyn, Warranty
of Quality I, supra, at 714 n.44 (citing Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54;
Isaacs, Business Security, supra note 200; Nathan Isaacs & Carl F. Taeusch, The NIRA in
the Book and in Business, 47 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1934) [hereinafter Isaacs & Taeusch,
NIRA]).
241. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 705-07 (1931).
242. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 38-39.
243. Isaacs, Business Security, supra note 200, at 211.
244. Isaacs, The Industrial Purchaser, supra note 240, at 263; Llewellyn, Warranty of
Quality I, supra note 240, at 714.
245. In the area of warranty, Llewellyn argued that the "lumping" of title with
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concept and instead became a conglomeration of separate
property interests that each demanded individual treatment."246
Llewellyn and Isaacs applied the delumping concept to the area
of risk of loss. Here both argued that the old notion that risk of
loss passed from the seller to buyer at the time of transfer of title
was outdated and needed to be disconnected. Once again, Isaacs
can be seen as the predecessor to Llewellyn on the notion of
delumping.2 47
Llewellyn's conception of the right kind of rules-the singing
rule-can be seen in lectures delivered by Isaacs which predated
Llewellyn's work. Isaacs stated that "the reason for a rule will
frequently determine the scope of that rule."2 48 Llewellyn's
innovation was the belief that the patent reason for a rule should
be part of the rule itself. For Isaacs, the reason for a rule was a
historical inquiry. Llewellyn attempted to externalize those
reasons in writing the UCC. The advantage of externalizing the
reason for a rule is that it allows the rule and its reason to be
analyzed critically. The problem with the antiquated rules of the
Uniform Sales Act was that they no longer provided guidance in
applying the rules to modern business transactions. The rules
had been severed from their underlying reason or purpose. For
Isaacs, this opened their interpretation to "false reason" and
thus, "false scope."249 Llewellyn sought to rectify this shortcoming
in the drafting of the UCC.
The Llewellynian notion of transaction types was previously
used by Isaacs to critique the First Restatement of Contracts as
ownership and risk was necessary for long distance sales. See Llewellyn, Warranty of
Quality I, supra note 240, at 712 (explaining that in the law of warranty, the relationship of
the buyer and seller and the solvency of the seller play into the civil obligation of contract).
246. Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405,
472-73 (2002) (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Sale in Legal Theory and in Practice, 26 VA. L.
REV. 651 (1940) [hereinafter Isaacs, Sale in Legal Theory]).
247. Llewellyn's 1938 article Through Title refers to Isaacs with great approval. Karl
N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 159, 159
(1938). Isaacs also took issue with the Tarling rule that held the setting aside of an item
for future delivery passed the risk of loss to the buyer. Isaacs added the element
previously missing from Llewellyn's campaign, a direct attack on the Tarling rule that
had long been codified in the Sales Act and was proposed for inclusion in federal law.
Robert L. Flores, Risk of Loss in Sales: A Missing Chapter in the History of the U.C.C.:
Through Llewellyn to Williston and a Bit Beyond, 27 PAC. L.J. 161, 212-13 (1996) ("The
rule was 'thoroughly logical' within the realm of property theory in which it had been
developed, but 'nonsensical' as judged by modem business practices, and so did not
comport with expectations of the parties." (quoting Isaacs, Sale in Legal Theory, supra
note 246, at 652)).
248. Nathan Isaacs, Lecture on Legal History 8 (Oct. 5. 1922) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 1, File: Lecture on Legal




an "idealized composite."25 0 In that critique, he provided a
description of the relationship of transaction types to contract
law. He asserted that the Restatement failed to grapple with the
deviations from general contract law to more specific contract
types, such as construction, real estate, employment, and
insurance contracts.25 ' Isaacs had fully articulated the concept of
transaction types that Llewellyn would later popularize.25 2
Llewellyn's reference to old paper rules252 that were devoid of
meaning is similar to what Isaacs referred to as "dry rules."25 4
Despite his many intellectual debts to Isaacs, Llewellyn did
not list him as a member of the realist movement either in his
famous 1931 polemic Some Realism or in his expanded
unpublished list of realists.25 5 This omission by Llewellyn, the
leading realist, could be understood as an implicit exclusion of
Isaacs from the movement. Professor Horwitz interprets the
omission of Isaacs and others from the list as an indication that
Llewellyn did not fully grasp the extent of the realist
movement.256 Relying upon these omissions, Professor Horwitz
casts doubt on the accuracy of Llewellyn's claim in Some Realism
that the movement was politically neutral." That argument
supports Professor Horwitz's larger point that realism was not
value neutral and had a leftist political valence.258 This Article
250. Nathan Isaacs, Some Thoughts Suggested by the Restatements, Particularly of
Contracts, Agency, and Trusts, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 424, 425 (1936) [hereinafter Isaacs,
Restatements].
251. Id. at 427.
252. Llewellyn's notion of situation-sense is exhibited in Isaacs's critique of the First
Restatement as "dangerously forgetful of the peculiarities of specific situations." Compare
Isaacs, Restatements, supra note 250, at 425, with KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121-22 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION] (noting the importance of a case's specific facts in its likely
disposition on appeal). For an excellent explanation of Llewellynian nomenclature, such
as type-facts, transaction-types, and situation-sense, see Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied
Terms of Contracts: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation-Sense,' in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 191 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); Larry A. DiMatteo,
Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397,
447-52 (2004) (reviewing tenets of Llewellynian thought).
253. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1237.
254. Isaacs, Restatements, supra note 250, at 428.
255. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1226 n.18; see HORWITZ,
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 183 (noting that Llewellyn failed to list "the original
and penetrating torts-contracts scholar Nathan Isaacs"); HULL, POUND AND LLEWELLYN,
supra note 1, at 343-46; N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange
over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987 WIs. L.
REV. 921, 968.
256. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 183.
257. Id. at 182; Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1254 ("When the matter of
program in the normative aspect is raised, the answer is: there is none.").
258. HORwlTz, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 1, at 170.
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argues that there were both radical and conservative realists,
and that Isaacs was a major conservative realist.
Llewellyn probably did not intend to exclude Isaacs's
contribution to the realist movement.' Llewellyn framed his
list in the context of Pound's criticism of the legal realists. It
contained the names of scholars that Llewellyn thought Pound
would have to agree were realists.2 60 Llewellyn's notes show that
he considered many more scholars legal realists.26 ' He
constructed his list for the Pound rebuttal with the assistance of
legal philosopher Felix Cohen;26 2 Cohen added to the list works
that exhibited common realist jurisprudential ground, such as
Isaacs's article on legal reasoning. That article, in Cohen's
estimation, was an enlightened exposition of traditional
doctrinal analysis that challenged the mathematically precise
process advanced by the legal formalists.26 3 Perhaps Cohen
viewed Isaacs as a less formal legal formalist or a quasi-realist
in that he remained faithful to the formalist belief of the central
place of legal principles, while being critical of the formalistic
application of those principles. In Some Realism About Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound, Llewellyn praised Isaacs's "more
recent work" as representative of the realist critique of the
incongruence between the rules courts applied and the operative
facts found in the cases.2 Whether or not Llewellyn considered
Isaacs a full-fledged member of the LRM, or whether he thought
that Isaacs's conservative realism was of a different kind than
mainstream legal realism, it is indisputable that Isaacs's
scholarship was influential in Llewellyn's construction of the
UCC.
259. Llewellyn noted the attention that Isaacs had paid to the lawyer as a business
counselor. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1246 & n.61 (citing Isaacs, Business
Security, supra note 200; Nathan Isaacs, How Lawyers Think, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 555
(1923) [hereinafter Isaacs, How Lawyers Think]).
260. See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 1, at 50-51 (observing that in his
critique of realist thinkers, Pound never offers a single scholar whom he believed to be
a realist, even when Llewellyn privately prompted him for examples).
261. Id. at 51; Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1233-34.
262. Cohen's contributions were separately noted in Llewellyn's notes. Llewellyn,
Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1233 n.34.
263. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1236 n.36 (citing Isaacs, How
Lawyers Think, supra note 259). Cohen provided a number of examples of Isaacs's work to
Llewellyn. See id. at 1242 n.47 (illustrating that Cohen called Llewellyn's attention to
Isaacs's discussions of formal legal devices that were concealing the real business
purposes of transactions in Nathan Isaacs, The Promoter: A Legislative Problem, 38 HARV.
L. REV. 887, 890 (1925) [hereinafter Isaacs, Promoter] and Isaacs, Business Security,
supra note 200).
264. Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 1, at 1236 n.36 (citing Isaacs, Promoter,
supra note 263).
346 [ 47:2
2010] BEYOND RULES 347
E. Questioning Hohfeld's Reconceptualization of Law
Another possible, though ultimately unpersuasive,
explanation of Llewellyn's omission of Isaacs from his lists of
realists is the friction resulting from Isaacs's sometimes rough
intellectual treatment of Llewellyn's revered mentor at Yale,
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.265 Isaacs initially had praised
Hohfeld's work on Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning and had adopted his ideas in The
Standardizing of Contracts.2 66 Subsequently, Hohfeld wrote to
Isaacs in appreciation for "the fresh thinking that you are
contributing to some of the great problems of the law."267
However, Isaacs and Hohfeld's relationship soured. Hohfeld saw
no contradiction between the analytical approach that
characterized his own work and the sociological jurisprudence of
Pound.268 In one article, Isaacs criticized Hohfeld's division of
legal scholarship into several different, yet complimentary fields
by pointing out how these diverse methods contradicted each
other.2" In contrast, Isaacs argued that in different periods of the
cycle of legal history, different schools of legal interpretation
come to the fore.270 Later, Isaacs referred to Hohfeld's speech to
the Association of American Law Schools, in which he called for
the simultaneous analysis of the different styles of legal study, as
evidence that Hohfeld himself did not think his analytical system
sufficed for all purposes.2 7' He did praise Hohfeld's "meticulous
265. In a biographical note for Hohfeld, Llewellyn stated that while Hohfeld's
conceptual analysis "can obviously solve no cases it makes for clarification and cuts very
close to the atomic structure of the law on its conceptual side." Karl N. Llewellyn, Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 400, 401 (Edwin R.A.
Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932).
266. Isaacs, Standardizing Contracts, supra note 54, at 39 n.19 (citing Hohfeld,
Fundamental, supra note 133).
267. Letter from Wesley N. Hohfeld to Nathan Isaacs (Nov. 21, 1917) (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 2, File:
Correspondence regarding articles and books, 1917-1919) ("It seems to me that we are all
under a debt to you for your very acute and penetrating analysis of the legal-historical
phenomena which you have handled.").
268. N.E.H. Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 235, 273 (1995) [hereinafter Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence]; see Roscoe
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 594-95
(1911) (criticizing the analytical jurisprudence of contemporary American legal scholars).
269. Isaacs compared Hohfeld's desire for the simultaneous teaching of many
different approaches to law to a gluttonous character in a joke: "A man in a restaurant
once ordered a cherry pie, mince pie, peach pie, and lemon pie. The waiter quietly asked,
'What's the matter with the apple pie?'" Nathan Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence:
Their Places in History and Their Present Alignment, 31 HARV. L. REV. 373, 374 (1918).
270. Id. at 375.
271. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 36 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1923) (reviewing WESLEY
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insistence on the careful use of certain words."2 ' 2 He thought
Hohfeld's vision was relevant "when he endeavors to see farthest
and recognizes in the whole analytical process mere preliminary
work that must be followed by a study of the relation of law to
life's needs.""' Still, ardent followers of Hohfeld 274 thought
Isaacs's review of a posthumous collection of Hohfeld's essays to
be unfair. 7 1 In contrast, Llewellyn, who was well on his way to
nonformalist heterodoxy, wrote to Isaacs expressing agreement
with the main points of his review. He agreed with Isaacs's
proposition that there was a need to study the relationship
between law and society's needs and not to solely focus on
refining the law's conceptualism.27 6
VI. ISAACS's OPPOSITION TO THE NEW DEAL
Isaacs became deeply opposed to New Deal legislation, which
he believed was irrationally antibusiness.27 7 During the 1930s,
Isaacs stressed his faith in the existence of objective legal
principles and the ability of judges to make decisions
independent of any economic and social prejudices.2 78 This change
in emphasis appears to be in conflict with his realist insights. In
fact, Isaacs had stressed the importance of general legal principle
from the beginning of his career, and he remained true to his
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923)) [hereinafter Isaacs, reviewing HOHFELD];
see Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence, supra note 268, at 271 (making a similar
argument).
272. Isaacs, reviewing HOHFELD, supra note 271, at 1041.
273. Id. at 1042.
274. Dedicated acolytes on the Yale faculty included Arthur Corbin and the realist
Walter Wheeler Cook. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of
Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 721 (1919) (arguing that Hohfeld's work was a major contribution
to analytical jurisprudence); Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification,
30 YALE L.J. 226, 226 (1921).
275. Letter from Roger S. Justin, Harvard Law Review Book Review Editor, to
Nathan Isaacs (Nov. 14, 1923) (on file with Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American
Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio) (writing to Isaacs that he had talked with the
Managing Editor of the Yale Law Journal, "who is apparently a more ardent
Hohfeldian [than Llewellyn], and he had considered your review more or less of a
'slam'").
276. Letter from Karl Llewellyn to Nathan Isaacs (Sept. 5, 1923) (on file with Jacob
Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio).
277. Nathan Isaacs, Business Law in Transition 4 (n.d.) [hereinafter Isaacs,
Transition] (unpublished manuscript, on file with Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Box 2, File: Unpublished, Alphabetically, undated).
278. Nathan Isaacs, Address to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences:
Political, Legal, and Economic Logics-and Logic (Jan. 13, 1937) [hereinafter Isaacs,
Political, Legal, and Economic Logics] (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches, 1937).
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theories of adaptive legal cycles and legal reasoning to the end of
it. However, Isaacs's application of these ideas dramatically
shifted from the early 1920s to the 1930s, most likely in response
to the national calamities of the times and their changing
implications for his legal theories for business.
A. The New Deal as Unconstitutional Impediment to Business
In 1922, Isaacs had argued for increased federal power in
order to facilitate the growth of a national economy.2 " He had
then dismissed the importance of the Commerce Clause
restrictions on federal power. At that time, he believed that the
U.S. Constitution would give way to contemporary necessity.28 0
By 1934, though he continued to oppose Lochner-era
constitutional formalism, he advocated constitutional limits on
the federal commerce power because he concluded that the
motivation of the New Deal program was thoughtless
281
antibusiness animus.
In the early 1920s, Isaacs argued that history made greater
government regulation of the economy inevitable. For example,
he argued that American constitutional law would have to
uphold price fixing legislation in order to adapt to changing social
conditions.282 In relation to the Interstate Commerce Clause,282 he
declared that the lines of division between the state and federal
governments were "mere chalk"; that state lines ignore the
communication revolution that had made a single "business unit
of the country."28 4 Isaacs then justified the expansion of the
federal government's commerce power by drawing an analogy to
279. See Nathan Isaacs, Federal Control over Industry, 16 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 432,
443 (1922) [hereinafter Isaacs, Federal Control] (describing the increase in national power
in medieval England through the centralization of authority and the corresponding social
good and suggesting that the United States could benefit from greater centralization of
governmental power).
280. See id. (arguing that federal power should expand to meet the realities of the
time and that it was "misleading to brand the resulting federalization as federal
usurpation").
281. See Isaacs & Taeusch, NIRA, supra note 240, at 463-65 (criticizing the New
Deal era's National Industrial Recovery Act as an ambiguous "delegation to business
men . . . [, which] assumes that after a generation of legal terrorizing of business
men. . . [that] these same business leaders will be ready at a moment's notice to accept a
charter and govern themselves").
282. Nathan Isaacs, Revival of the Justum Pretium, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 381, 397-400
(1921).
283. The Annual Meeting, 16 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 111, 111-12 (1922) (describing the
proceedings of the seventeenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association
and noting Nathan Isaacs was one of the speakers on the topic of "centralization versus
decentralization in the relation of the national government to the states").
284. Isaacs, Federal Control, supra note 279, at 440.
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the extension of the King's power over feudal units in medieval
England.285 Isaacs advocated the expansion of national power in
order to facilitate the growth of business. So far as state power
fails "to correspond to actualities," he insisted that "we may
depend upon the 'law in action' to deviate from the law of the
books so as to meet the practical needs of business."28 Such a
divergence between the law in action and the law of the books
would render law less facilitative and relevant to business.
In contrast, the New Deal, for Isaacs, represented law as an
impediment to business. He thought most New Deal legislation
was irrational and violated fundamental legal principles. In
Isaacs's view, the New Deal of the mid-1930s was class conscious,
pro-labor, and unfairly antibusiness.2 87 Isaacs's anti-New Deal
stance was part of a broader pro-business attack on the Roosevelt
administration.2 88 Conservatives articulated their opposition to
the growing New Deal state by claiming that its policies
threatened individual liberty and self-reliance.289 Isaacs believed
that the most important challenge to the New Deal would come
from the self-reliant character of human nature.29 0 In an October
1934 speech, he declared that instead of relying upon economists,
who were overborne by the immensity of the depression's
challenge, the crisis could be resolved by relying upon business
principles and the traditions of free private enterprise.
285. Id. at 440-43 (maintaining that as English life "became national, national
jurisdiction had to expand to take care of it").
286. Id. at 443.
287. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 414 (2007) (arguing
that there was a pro-large business First New Deal and a more pro-working class Second
New Deal). Isaacs was opposed to both New Deals. He contended that much of the major
New Deal legislation, including the early National Industrial Recovery and Securities and
Exchange Acts, as well as the later "one sided" National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act), reflected to a great degree "the assumption of some of the New Dealers, that
business is intrinsically wicked." Isaacs, Transition, supra note 277, at 4; see Isaacs &
Taeusch, NIRA, supra note 240, at 459 (mockingly comparing NIRA's premise that
eliminating unfair competition would end the depression to the Biblical prophets'
assumption of "a supernatural connection between sin and punishment, between
repentance and recovery").
288. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 471-88 (1959);
see Isaacs, Transition, supra note 277, at 4.
289. SCHLESINGER, supra note 288, at 472-73.
290. See Nathan Isaacs, Address Before the Harvard Business School Club of Boston:
Government by Bribery (Nov. 19, 1935) (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches, 1935) (observing that no matter how
strong a government may be it "cannot control the wants and fads and whims of human
nature").
291. Praise and Blame Given New Deal, HARTFORD TIMES, Dec. 7, 1934 (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper
Clippings, 1924-1941); Speakers Flay, Laud New Deal at Wesleyan, NEW HAVEN J.
350 [ 47:2
BEYOND RULES
Isaacs based his attack on New Deal legislation on three
beliefs. First, that much of the New Deal exceeded the
constitutional limits of federal government power. He
acknowledged that drastic federal government action had been
spurred by what seemed "both a complete failure and a surrender
on the part of the states at the height of the depression."2 92
However, Isaacs believed that early New Deal legislation such as
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),293 the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA), 294 and the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 (the Guffey Act)2 95 were unconstitutional exertions of
control over intrastate commerce."
The second basis of his critique, which Isaacs thought had
more weight, was his argument that the New Dealers' faith in
government ignored the fact that people make decisions often
influenced by emotions and irrationality.2 97 Isaacs himself
attributed the faults of the market to human nature's tendency
to "stock gambling, booms, and depressions."" This is a
rudimentary argument that the rational human actor is a flawed
decisionmaker. The more recent behavioral LAE reflects this
questioning of the rationality assumption of economics.299
Third, Isaacs warned that government is "limited in its
ability to gather and digest information." 00 Isaacs thought there
COURIER, Dec. 7, 1934 (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard
Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
292. Nathan Isaacs, The State and the Nation z-2 [hereinafter Isaacs, The State and
the Nation] (unpublished manuscript, on file with Baker Library Historical Collections,
Harvard Business School, Box 4, File: Business Law, undated (5 of 5)).
293. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
294. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
295. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991.
296. See Hamilton Thornquist, Government by Bribery Charged in AAA and Guffey
Coal Control, BOSTON TRAVELER, Nov. 19, 1935 (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
297. See Charges New Deal Loses Sight of Human Nature, BOSTON TRAVELER, Nov.
14, 1935 [hereinafter New Deal Loses Sight] (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
298. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 31 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 774, 775 (1936) (reviewing
BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND
1800-1867 (1936)).
299. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 196-97 (1957)
(examining the notion of "bounded rationality"); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (studying the influence of heuristics and biases in the
decisionmaking process).
300. See New Deal Loses Sight, supra note 297.
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was "great danger" in the belief of the effectiveness of
government action which was "a fundamental axiom, preceding
and underlying" the entire New Deal program."o This third belief
is the efficiency argument that informs modern law and
economics. The primary tenet of this belief is that governmental
regulation is inherently more inefficient than freely made
contracts.
The NIRA in particular upset Isaacs. Isaacs and Carl
Taeusch mockingly compared the NIRA's premise that the end of
unfair competition would end the depression to the Biblical belief
that repentance would bring salvation.02 He excoriated the
administrators of the National Recovery Act as "petty bullies who
shook their fists in the faces of worried shopkeepers or
innkeepers and threatened them with dire consequences because
of anonymous accusations of having violated impossible code
provisions.""o' More temperedly, Isaacs called attention to the
many obstacles faced by administrators, including constitutional
and statutory constraints, political and lobbying pressure, and
the practical administrative difficulties of conducting business
operations as a government agency.304
On May 27, 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed the NIRA
unconstitutional, in part because the act regulated intrastate
commerce.0 5 In an unpublished manuscript, Isaacs argued that
the NIRA "fell to pieces eventually both for practical and legal
reasons."0 ' The practical fault was that most NIRA codes, "so far
as they dealt with competition at all, were aimed against
aggressive competition or uncomfortable competition, or possibly
against competition altogether."' The legal barriers were the
constitutional limitations on congressional regulation of intrastate
commerce and "an abuse of the limit of the power of Congress to
delegate legislative details to administrative officers.,,
As noted above, Isaacs's view of the Constitution was not
value neutral. He was willing to embrace non-New Deal "growth
of government control over business."' However, this was a
301. Id.
302. Isaacs & Taeusch, NIRA, supra note 240, at 459.
303. Nathan Isaacs, The NRA Decision, 13 HARV. BUS. REV. 393, 394 (1935)
[hereinafter Isaacs, NRA Decision].
304. Nathan Isaacs, Administrative Limitations, 2 U. PITT. L. REV. 103, 104-05
(1936).
305. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-48 (1935).
306. Isaacs, The State and the Nation, supra note 292, at z-3.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Nathan Isaacs, Where Business and Government Meet 1, 5 (Dec. 28, 1934) (on
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limited control that had to support one of two objectives-the
promotion of business or societal fairness. Under the fairness
rationale, Isaacs was willing to support the constitutionality of
state, as opposed to federal, labor and social welfare legislation.ao
In the end, his conservative cultural commitment was a
reflection of the values of business and American
individualism."' While Isaacs acknowledged that the aid of
government might be necessary to end the Great Depression, he
insisted that such government action support conventional
business initiative rather than hinder it.3 12
B. Constitutional Interpretation: Realist, Strict, and Isaacs's
Principles
The main premise for Isaacs's opposition to the Securities
Act of 1933 was his belief that it exceeded the constitutional
limits of federal power. He believed that because securities were
primarily the products of intrastate commerce, they were not
subject to federal regulation.13 He labeled those that supported
the Act as "realist" and those who opposed it as "verbalist."3 14
But Isaacs neither believed in a literal interpretation of the
Constitution nor did he accept the indeterminacy posed by the
view that the Constitution was a body of "general and vague"
terms.15 Isaacs embraced the premises of the 1930s realist
theory of constitutional interpretation that eschewed a literal
interpretation of the text but believed that an honest
file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 3, File:
Speeches, 1934) (providing a synopsis of a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the
Collegiate Teachers of Business Law in Chicago). In this paper, Isaacs discussed the state
as a business actor and influencer of business decisions and argued that it was necessary to
formulate "principles governing the conduct" of business in relation to the government. Id.
310. Isaacs, NRA Decision, supra note 303, at 404.
311. Nathan Isaacs, Address at Wesleyan University 12 (Dec. 6, 1934) (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 3, File: Speeches,
1934).
I do maintain that one of the reasons for our delay in recovering from the slump
in business is that in this sense we have entirely too many economists among us
and not enough business men. I mean that we have too many who are staggered
at the magnitude of external forces and too many perfectly willing to surrender
rather than to do the obvious things that business tradition would suggest, and,
furthermore, that we have too great a tendency to look for alibis, to look for
personal devils, to look for explanations that will not only exonerate us from all
the blame but that will excuse us from all further effort.
Id.
312. Id. at 15.
313. Isaacs, Securities Act, supra note 109, at 222-23.
314. Id. at 220.
315. Id. at 218.
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application of underlying constitutional principles would render
the Securities Act and other New Deal legislation
unconstitutional.' The social engineering approach of the
realists reflected a radically dynamic view of the nature of law.
Felix Frankfurter"' had argued that the Supreme Court should
merely ascertain "whether there is a legitimate object to be
accomplished by any particular piece of legislation."318 Under that
view, the Act only needed to satisfy a rational basis test for
constitutionality. In contrast, Isaacs argued that this rational
nexus approach was inadequate to protect important
constitutional values.' He urged a "compromise" that
emphasized a spirit-of-the-law approach, but not one that would
go so far as to emancipate the Constitution from history.320
A vivid display of the CLR of Isaacs is his merger of the
realist claim that much of law was not in harmony with modern
times and his idealistic claim that underlying principles were
the proper means of adjustment. In 1934, he acknowledged that
America was enduring a crisis that was "a supreme test of
adjustability."32 1 To deal with this situation he wanted to
formulate principles based on actual developments in
constitutional law. The constitutionality of federal legislation
should then be tested in light of these principles.32 2 A principled
approach would allow for flexibility in application, but would
prevent the indeterminacy represented by the radical,
antiliteral approach. He rejected the radical realist view that all
that is reasonable, desirable, or necessary is constitutional.
Isaacs saw the principled approach as a more proper form of
realist interpretation rather than a strict interpretation that
316. Id. at 225.
317. An obituary reported that Isaacs had been "associated" with Frankfurter.
Mourned: Prof Nathan Isaacs, CHI. ADVOc., Jan. 16, 1942 (on file with the American
Jewish Historical Society).
318. Isaacs, Securities Act, supra note 109, at 218 (summarizing the interpretative
view advocated in Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law,
29 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1916)).
319. Isaacs, The Securities Act, supra note 109, at 221. In his view, the Supreme
Court "must have the vision to read our fundamental charter progressively, but also the
courage to resist panic." Nathan Isaacs, Cutler Lectures at the University of Rochester:
Recovery Under the Constitution: The Spirit of the Constitution 10 (Apr. 19, 1934) (on file
with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 2, File: New
Deal-Cutler Lectures, 1934 (Un. Of Rochester) (2 of 2)).
320. Nathan Isaacs, Cutler Lectures at the University of Rochester: Recovery Under
The Constitution: The Natural History of Constitutions 11 (Apr. 17, 1934) (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 2, File: New-Deal-
Cutler Lectures, 1934 (Un. Of Rochester) (2 of 2)).
321. Id. at 15.
322. Id. at 11.
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would irrationally stretch the meaning of "interstate
commerce."323 This strain of Isaacs's thought is akin with the
postwar Legal Process School, which acknowledged that judges
make law but insisted that impersonal principles disciplined
them.324
Isaacs believed that the spirit, rather than the letter of the
Constitution, should be decisive when deciding between
different courses of action.2 When making such a decision, the
interpreter needed to see whether the intended course of action,
the statute, violated "an essential principle" of the
Constitution.3 26 Charles Black, decades later, similarly rejected
the "purported explication or exegesis" of the constitutional text
"as a directive of action."327 Isaacs argued that an application of
constitutional principles in this manner would have resulted in
the voiding of the Securities Act. He believed the only legal
means that would allow such federal regulation was through a
constitutional amendment.2  According to his cycle theory, a
constitutional amendment was the only legitimate means to
begin a new cycle of codification.
Isaacs's opposition to what he perceived as the excessive
government regulation of business that characterized many
New Deal measures reinforced his distaste for legal fictions.
Isaacs sharply described the AAA 2' and the Guffey Act,3 which
gave tax breaks in exchange for following federal government
requirements, as "government by bribery."3'1 In a November 19,
1935 speech to the Harvard Business School Club of Boston,
Isaacs attacked these laws' reliance on the "grotesque
subterfuge[] ... [of] 'voluntary agreements' that are about as
voluntary in fact as the votes of confidence flaunted by
European dictators."33 2 He warned that if the Guffey Act "stands
as law, 'the door is wide open for control by the Federal
323. See Isaacs, The Securities Act, supra note 109, at 219 (criticizing the Securities
Act by opining that "[tlo call the issuing of securities connected with the organization of a
corporation under state law a matter of interstate commerce ... is blowing the bubble
until it bursts").
324. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at lxviii-xcvi.
325. Isaacs, The Securities Act, supra note 109, at 221.
326. Id. at 221-22.
327. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTmE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTIPUTIONAL LAW 7
(1969) (advocating a method of constitutional interpretation that involves "inference from
the structures and relationships created by the constitution").
328. Isaacs, The Securities Act, supra note 109, at 225.
329. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
330. Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991.




Government of every detail in the life of every person in the
United States, regardless of the Constitution."'33 In 1936, the
conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that
the provisions of the AAA and the Guffey Act were
unconstitutional. 34 Isaacs noted in an undated manuscript, that
must have been written shortly after these decisions were
decided, that the Supreme Court held the laws unconstitutional
"because the court looked through the mechanism to the reality
of an attempted regulation of that which it was beyond the power
of Congress to regulate."
C. Reconciliation
Professor Weisbrod has noted that throughout Isaacs's "work
there is a descriptive or analytic rather than prescriptive
quality."336 That descriptive mindset allowed Isaacs to adapt his
thought to the legal landscape created by the New Deal.3  He
remained confident that the Supreme Court would craft decisions
striking a balance between the public and private spheres of law.
He agreed with the views of the Supreme Court's conservative
majority, but he also agreed with the liberal proposition that the
338Constitution should evolve in order to keep up with the times.
By 1937, shortly before the Supreme Court began upholding New
Deal legislation,3 Isaacs retreated from his alarmist warnings
about the New Deal and accepted the National Labor Relations
Act, the centerpiece of the "Second New Deal."340
Isaacs was ultimately reconciled in part to the New Deal in
two ways. First, he accepted the more expansive interpretation of
interstate commerce that the Supreme Court began to develop in
1937. Isaacs thought that Virginian Railway Co. v. System
333. Id.
334. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 239 (1936) (holding the Guffey Act
unconstitutional); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 1 (1936) (holding the AAA
unconstitutional).
335. Isaacs, The State and the Nation, supra note 292, at z-4.
336. Weisbrod, Way We Live, supra note 11, at 787 n.44.
337. In 1937, President Roosevelt introduced his infamous court-packing plan by
declaring that "Imleans must be found to adapt our legal forms and our judicial
interpretation to the actual present national needs of the largest progressive democracy in
the modern world." 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 639-40 (1938). Isaacs
noted that Roosevelt's proposal was based on the premise that the courts should respond to
political pressure. Isaacs, Political, Legal, and Economic Logics, supra note 278, at 5.
338. Isaacs, Securities Act, supra note 109, at 221.
339. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133, 142 (1995).
340. See FIONA VENN, THE NEW DEAL 57-61 (1998) (explaining that the National
Labor Relations Act fell within this Second New Deal).
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Federation No. 40,"l which held that the Railway Labor Act
applied to back-shop employees engaged in the repair of
locomotives and carriers, had enunciated "a very important
principle-namely, that whether an activity comes within the
scope of the interstate commerce clause or not depends not
merely on the activity but on the type of regulation under
consideration."342 Isaacs recognized this new departure, not as a
legal fiction, but as an important new principle. However, Isaacs
did find it "surprising ... that in each of the five cases that
reached the Supreme Court for consideration it was found that
interstate commerce was directly affected.""' However, it is far
from clear whether Isaacs would have accepted the farthest
implications of the aggregation doctrine later accepted by the
Supreme Court.344 In 1937, the full implications of the new
doctrine were far from clear to Isaacs.345 Perhaps a second, and
more important reason, why Isaacs accepted the National Labor
Relations Act was his sympathy for the impetus of the law, which
Isaacs described as the persistent "demand for improved labor
conditions."346
Isaacs was now prepared to admit again, as he did before the
New Deal, that judges should not rely solely on one line of legal
reasoning to direct them to the correct decision. But he insisted
that it was important to retain the idealism of universal
principles even if they could not truly be formulated: "[Elvery
practical man ... may find himself something of a Kantian,
though he has never studied philosophy. He rationalizes his
conduct by stating it in generalized terms .. ."34 Under this
view, judicial decisionmaking and law in action worked within
the shadow of general principles. Isaacs's CLR recognized the
folly of deciding real cases through pure deduction from
principles. But he also recognized the use of principles as an end
goal of legal evolution. Principles provided a normative goal that
the law would strive toward but never fully reach.
Isaacs was willing to reconcile his deep-seated commitment
to free enterprise to the new spirit of the times. In 1940, he
341. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
342. Isaacs, The State and the Nation, supra note 292, at z-7.
343. Id.
344. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
345. Dr. Isaacs Sees Field of Doubt in Labor Cases: Says Wagner Rulings Make
Meaning of Interstate Commerce Uncertain (n.d.) (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941). No
masthead information is present on the document.
346. Isaacs, The State and the Nation, supra note 292, at z-6.
347. Isaacs, Political, Legal, and Economic Logics, supra note 278, at 30.
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declared that "[wie no longer believe in self-starting,
automatically-controlled competition as nature's sacred device for
regulating markets."" He concluded that the control of business
is "a social and political matter in which the law can be used and
must be used," but he cautioned that the "law has its
limitations."34 9 Isaacs adopted Holmes's view that the law "uses
the vocabulary of morals, but its tests are and must be
externalized and standardized."o Accordingly, the moralizing
tone the regulation of business had taken frustrated him. He
viewed the Robinson-Patman Act of 1935,51 which limited the
ability of large retailers and chain stores to cut retail prices, as
an anticompetitive law that was masquerading as pro-
competitive antitrust law.' Congressman Emanuel Cellar of
New York relied upon Isaacs's negative description of the
Robinson-Patman Act in order to oppose the proposed bill for
being anticompetitive and anticonsumer." In general, Isaacs
accepted the pro-regulation verdict of history but remained
committed to the belief that many depression-era laws were
anticompetitive in nature.3 54
348. Nathan Isaacs, Barrier Activities and the Courts: A Study in Anti-Competitive
Law, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 382, 390 (1941) [hereinafter Isaacs, Barrier Activities].
349. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 48 J. POL. ECON. 275, 277 (1940) (reviewing JOHN
M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1939)).
350. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 46 J. POL. ECON. 262, 263 (1938) (reviewing
FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP & PHILLIP G. Fox, BUSINESS ETHICS: STUDIES IN FAIR
COMPETITION (1937)).
351. Robinson-Patman Act of 1935, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006)).
352. Isaacs, Barrier Activities, supra note 348, at 390; E. P. Learned & Nathan
Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARV. BUS.
REV. 137, 139 (1937); see also Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 712, 713
(1939) (reviewing D. KNIGHT Dix, THE LAw RELATING TO COMPETITIVE TRADING (1938))
(arguing that the antitrust laws had hindered cooperation between business); Isaacs, The
State and the Nation, supra note 292, at z-9 ("The Robinson-Patman Act has been given
an artificial place in the anti-trust laws by being made into a substitute for the old
Section 2 of the Clayton Act. In reality it differs radically from the traditional law of anti-
trust laws in that it checks competition, whereas all of the other anti-trust laws relied on
competition as their main spring.").
353. Anti-Chain Store Bill Attacked, SYRACUSE J., Apr. 10, 1936 (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper
Clippings, 1924-1941).
354. See Isaacs, Barrier Activities, supra note 348, at 390. He remained a staunch
opponent of the Robinson-Patman Act. See Learned & Isaacs, supra note 352, at 155.
Isaacs and Learned, without using the terms "horizontal" or "vertical" competition, laid
out the distinction which leads contemporary antitrust law to allow vertical competition:
"mhe important problem is: Who are in competition? Are wholesalers and chain stores in
competition? Certainly not directly since the chains do not seek the same customers as
the wholesalers, but indirectly the customers of the wholesalers are in competition with
the retail units of the chains." Id. at 146. Thanks to Professor Horwitz for suggesting that
Isaacs's may have made a pioneering insight into vertical competition. Isaacs was on the
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Isaacs never abandoned his conservative, pro-business
standpoint. He was willing to compromise his commitment to free
enterprise to the need to prepare America for World War II. He
argued that impending war emergencies called for a revision of
the business practices of distributors that would be partly
voluntary and partly compulsory.' Isaacs supported wartime
price controls.' He admitted to an audience of business people5 .
that the weakening of constitutional safeguards in an emergency
was dangerous for democracy, but it was necessary to take that
risk in order to quickly return to that "longed-for time when the
nations of the earth will enjoy another respite from the horrors of
war.'"" Isaacs promised that the "greater the voluntary
contribution of business to the meeting of the emergency, the
smaller will be the Government control and the quicker will be our
recovery" and a return to that "longed-for time."' Nonetheless, he
remained troubled by peacetime anticompetitive acts.360
VII. ISAACS AND LEGAL REASONING
Isaacs's understanding of legal reasoning informed his
general CLR approach. Indeed, all of his doctrinal work was
shaped by his stance on this issue. He was an early contributor to
the legal realists' attempts to recognize the contingencies and
intuitions inherent in legal reasoning. Nonetheless, he sought to
justify traditional, deductive legal reasoning as the pragmatic
and best way to deal with legal problems, while eschewing any
board of directors of a chain store-Gimbel Brothers. See Two New Directors for Gimbel
Bros., WOMEN'S WEAR WKLY., Apr. 19, 1933 (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
Isaacs's reasoning regarding the Robinson-Patman act is entirely consistent with his
broader thinking on similar issues.
355. Nathan Isaacs, Address before Boston Conference on Distribution: War
Emergencies and Trade Practices 1 (Oct. 7, 1940) (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: War Emergencies and Trade Practices,
Oct. 1940).
356. Voluntary Action Urged in Emergency, N.Y. WOMEN'S DAILY, Oct. 8, 1940
[hereinafter Voluntary Action] (on file with Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard
Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
357. He delivered this speech in the Statler Hotel in Boston, in a conference on
distribution. Business Problems Discussed: Boston and National Leaders in Notable
Conference, BOSTON POST, Oct. 8, 1940 (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper Clippings, 1924-1941).
358. Voluntary Action, supra note 356.
359. Id.
360. Delay Feared in Ending Curb on Free Trade: Wider Control Predicted for
Business in Face ofNational Emergency, N.Y. HERALD-TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1941 (on file with
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 5, File: Newspaper
Clippings, 1924-1941).
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claims to scientific exactness. While cognizant of the
contingencies and faults of traditional legal reasoning, Isaacs
defended its legitimacy. He argued that there is a "power-quite
different from knowledge-which comes from legal training and
from contact with legal traditions.""' He relied on a similar
pragmatism to defend the study of the humanities, social
sciences, and especially Jewish law, which was also the product of
a learned legal tradition.362 He merged this nonformalist but
conservative theory of legal reasoning with a thoughtful and
measured conservative political, economic, and religious
philosophy.
Isaacs's CLR approach provided a moderate alternative to
the more radical realists' criticism of legal reasoning. Eskridge
and Frickey have described the conservative version of realist
legal reasoning adopted by Isaacs as an "organic theory of
rationalism."36 3 This description of CLR is neither formalistic nor
fully realist in its approach to legal reasoning. An organic theory
of rationalism assumes that hard cases cannot be decided by pure
deduction but should be decided by reference to underlying
"principles" and "equities."6  This version of legal realism,
espoused by Dean Pound, Justice Cardozo,6 Isaacs, and the later
Llewellyn,36 recognizes the role of discretion and law creation in
judicial reasoning. But it is a limited discretion and creativity in
which underlying principles, sometimes unarticulated, regulate
the creative process.6
Isaacs was attracted to an understanding of legal reasoning
which rejected the formalistic search for a right legal answer, yet
still bestowed legitimacy to traditional lawyerly ways of thinking.
361. Nathan Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CAL. L. REV. 39, 42-43
(1935) (explaining that there is a "practical reason for not assuming that a lawyer
warrants his conclusion of law to be true").
362. Letter from Isaacs [Jurist] to Oko [the Bookman] 3 (n.d.) (on file with Jacob Rader
Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oko Papers, Box 8, File 2).
363. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3, at lxiii.
364. Id.
365. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcIAL PRocEss 88-89 (1921). Isaacs
was distantly related to Cardozo through marriage and developed a friendly relationship
with him. Nathan Isaacs's aunt, Julia Nathan, was married to Benjamin Cardozo's uncle, a
brother of Cardozo's mother. Wotitzky Interview, supra note 12. After Cardozo was elevated
to the Supreme Court, Isaacs visited Washington. Cardozo wrote to Isaacs that he had
"yearned to see" him, but "[ulnfortunately the Court sessions and the bar receptions used up
all my days." Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to Nathan Isaacs (Oct. 16, 1932) (on file with
Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio).
366. The "later Llewellyn" refers to the more moderate form of realism that he
developed later in his career and culminating with LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION, supra note 252, at 60-61.
367. Id. at 217.
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His familiarity with the evolution of Jewish law likely attracted
him to modified natural law and neo-Kantian philosophy. These
philosophies set the goal of legal reasoning to be the discovery of
objective principles, while allowing those principles to grow and
change with new conditions. This goal is similar to that of the
Marburg Neo-Kantian School lead by Rudolph Stammler.'
Stammler believed in "a natural law with a variable content."369
Isaacs's student notes from Dean Pound's class reveal that he
was attracted to Stammler's search for "general," but still
contingent, principles rather than universally true principles. 70
He held to the Kantian objectivity of law but recognized that the
substance of that law changed over time.'
The task for Isaacs was to reconcile the universality of
natural law principles and the incoherency of legal
conceptualism-the application of general principles to rapidly
changing content. The pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey, who
greatly influenced Isaacs and other realists, believed that the
task of reconciliation was impossible because the admission of
the changing or dynamic nature of law was "fatal to everything
which the doctrine" of natural law was supposed to mean.'
368. "[A]t the turn of the [twentieth] century Neo-Kantianism was the dominant
academic philosophy or Schulphilosophie in the German universities." 7 FREDERICK
COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 436 (1965). The founder of that school was
Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), who dedicated his later work to Jewish philosophy. Simon
Kaplan, Translator's Introduction to HERMANN COHEN, RELIGION OF REASON: OUT OF THE
SOURCES OF MODERN JUDAISM xi, xi, xiii (1919) (Simon Kaplan trans., 1972). Modern
researchers have relied upon Stammler's "natural law with changing content" in order to
understand Jewish Law. B.S. Jackson, The Concept of Religious Law in Judaism, in 2
AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROMISCHEN WELT 33,37-38 (1979).
369. CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 248-49
(1930) (quoting RUDOLPH STAMMLER, THEORIE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 124 (1911);
RUDOLPH STAMMLER, DIE LEHRE VON DEM RICHTIGEN RECHTE 93, 196 (1902)).
370. Nathan Isaacs, Miscellaneous Class Notes 260 (on file with Harvard Law School
Library, Isaacs Class Notes 1919-1920, Box 1, File: Misc.) (describing Stammler's view of
"justice as a methodical weighing of interests"); see also id. at 274 (discussing the "Revival
of Natural Law in France").
371. A French school of legal philosophers headed by R. Saleilles and J. Charmont
further developed Stammler's theory of law. See HAINES, supra note 369, at 252
(discussing the French natural law school); id. at 252 n.1 ("gcole historique et droit
naturel d'apr&s quelques ouvrages recents . . . ." (quoting REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL 80-112 (1902)); id. at 258 ("[N]atural law... was universal, immutable...."
(quoting CHARMONT, LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT NATUREL 167 (1910)). "Just law, like the
law of nature, is a law or laws with specific legal content which is in accord with the
standard. It is then objectively just, but not absolutely just; for the moment the
circumstances change the same legal content will no longer be in accord with the standard
and hence will cease to be just." Id. at 250 (quoting Isaac Husik, The Legal Philosophy of
Rudolf Stammler, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 388 (1924)).
372. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 71, 84 (F.B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1941). See generally
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924).
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Indeed, this coherency argument was the basis of Isaacs's attack
on the natural law approach of the Lochner Court. However,
although Isaacs thought that the Court's version of natural law
theory was simplistic, he believed that a successful mediation
between the conflicting elements of general principles and
changing content was possible."' Isaacs thought that Dewey's
unique contribution was the insight that for different tasks there
were many different types of logic. Depending on the immediate
task, one kind of logic may depend heavily on intuition and
precedents, while others may require a more mathematical
rigor.74 There was no one ideal form of logic. 75 Isaacs believed
that this type of pragmatic reasoning had deep roots in the
common law.376
In order to better understand and improve the application of
principles to novel cases, Isaacs supported the legal realists'
proposition that it was not sufficient to study the purported logic
of decisions. Empirical social scientific research was necessary to
understand context and the true meaning of the law. In an
unpublished manuscript, Isaacs claimed that the first step in
reforming legal research was "an investigation of the facts of life
made by such surveys as are used in the other social sciences.
His contextual view of the law, later championed by Llewellyn in
the UCC, saw the danger that deductive logic could obliterate
background facts. Pure deductive logic would allow legal logic, at
times, to dismiss important contextual facts as irrelevant.7
373. Isaacs took Sir John William Salmond to task in a book review for dismissing
the concept of natural law without taking into account "the law-of-nature-with-a-
changing-content that the recent French writers have taken from Stammler and
developed into a system of their own." Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 34 HARV. L. REV. 222,
223 (1920) (reviewing SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 1920)); see
also Isaacs, Influence of Judaism on Western Law, supra note 157, at 385 (describing the
influence of the "Hebrew conception of natural law" upon modern European law).
374. Isaacs, Political, Legal, and Economic Logics, supra note 278, at 2.
375. Isaacs observed that Dewey's definition of logic included "any of the methods
actually used to reach conclusions, whether they be careless or extremely careful, whether
they involve demonstration or only approximation of the truth sought." Isaacs, How
Lawyers Think, supra note 259, at 556. Isaacs took handwritten notes of the following
courses delivered at the Columbia University Summer Session Courses in Law and
Special Conferences in Jurisprudence, July 10 to August 18: Roscoe Pound, Sociological
Jurisprudence; John Dewey, Some Problems in the Logic and Ethics of Law; W.W. Cook,
Some Problems in Legal Analysis. See id. at 556 n.2.
376. Id. at 556; Isaacs, Political, Legal, and Economic Logics, supra note 278, at 4
(recounting Lord Coke's classical defense of common law reasoning against the learned
King James's assertion that he could reason as well as the lawyers and, therefore, he
could decide cases for himself (citing Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 64, 65, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608))).
377. Isaacs, Appendix Technique, supra note 118, at 19.
378. See Isaacs, Political, Legal, and Economic Logics, supra note 278, at 27 (praising
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In an analysis of the fact-law distinction, Isaacs offered a
critical view of the distinction between issues of fact and issues of
law. Isaacs was one of the first American scholars to criticize the
generally accepted distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact as an artificial concept that disguised judicial
discretion.' Much later, the CLS movement seized upon this
distinction. Isaacs noted that judges often converted issues of fact
into issues of law. In the area of administrative law, Professor
Levin acknowledged that the distinction between law and
discretion is "an updated version of Nathan Isaacs'[s] remark
that 'whether a particular question is to be treated as a question
of law or a question of fact is not in itself a question of fact, but a
highly artificial question of law.'"ase
Isaacs's pragmatic view allowed for a great deal of flexibility
in legal reasoning. It also prevented him from falling into the
traps that ensnared legal formalists who claimed that there was
limited judicial discretion in finding the one right answer to
questions of law application.m' By criticizing the formalistic no-
discretion mindset of legal formalism, Isaacs was firmly
exhibiting his legal realist views. However, his CLR approach did
not see judicial discretion as a negative. He believed in the
common law system and its entrustment of judges with
discretion. Part of the reason he was so critical of the New Deal
was that he saw it as preempting judicial discretion in favor of
administrative discretion.' He was disturbed with the courts'
in contrast the excellent "reasoning" of a judicial opinion despite its faulty formal "logic").
An example of Isaacs's approach is his treatment of Conflict of Laws. Nathan Isaacs, Book
Review, 38 HARV. L. REV. 125, 129 (1924) (reviewing ERNEST G. LORENZEN, CASES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COuRTS (1924)).
379. "The delusive simplicity of the distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact has been found a will-of-the-wisp by travellers approaching it from
several directions." Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1922).
380. Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1, 16 & n.91 (1985) (citing Isaacs, supra note 379).
381. After surveying different eras of legal development, he concluded that "[wihen
one considers the vast fluctuations from time to time and from place to place in the extent
allowed to judicial discretion, one becomes skeptical, to say the least, as to whether there
is any right mixture, or at least as to whether we can ever hope to discover it." Nathan
Isaacs, The Limits of Judicial Discretion, 32 YALE L.J. 339, 352 (1923). For example,
Isaacs asserts that during periods "of growth by equity," there is a great deal of discretion
exercised by judges. Id. at 345. Roscoe Pound later cited this article to support the
proposition that "[tihere are many situations, however, where the course of judicial action
is left to be determined wholly by the judge's individual sense of what is right and just."
ROSCOE POUND, THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW 87 & n.62 (Liberty Fund 2002) (1958).
382. Nathan Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings, 30 YALE. L.J. 781,
797 (1921) [hereinafter Isaacs, Judicial Review] (asking the loaded rhetorical question: "Is
the country experiencing a general reaction against leaving important questions of
property to the uncontrolled discretion of non-judicial bodies?"); see also Letter from
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increased deference to administrative law decisions but predicted
that the courts would resume their overseeing role over
administrative agencies."' Isaacs advocated a proactive judicial
review of administrative law. This was founded on a belief that
courts and not governmental agencies were better equipped to
mediate the conflict between existing law and the changing needs
of society. This view was based upon the assumption that there
was an inherent tension between legal rules and governmental
regulation." The concern here was that administrators would be
unconstrained by the rule of law."' The root of Isaacs's
perspective was his respect for the judge-made common law and
the responsa of Jewish law. His conservatism was on the losing
side as progressives implemented the New Deal and ushered in
the modern administrative state.86 Isaacs's distrust of the
administrative state can be seen at work in LAE. Like his
mentor, Roscoe Pound, Isaacs turned against the political
program and the more extreme jurisprudential implications of
the LRM. In the end, Isaacs remained true to his idealistic faith
in the common law process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though scholars of the Legal Realist Movement of the 1930s
have largely neglected Nathan Isaacs, he was an influential early
legal realist whose insights are recognizable in the contemporary
legal academic landscape. Despite his legal realist approach to
law study, Isaacs remained an economic and jurisprudential
conservative. This seeming incongruence is reconcilable through
his adherence to a school of Jewish thought that emphasized
historical study and believed in flexible adaptation to new
conditions and contingencies, while affirming the divine and
binding nature of the law.3
Nathan Isaacs to B.M. Siegal (Dec. 6, 1921) (on file with Baker Library Historical
Collections, Harvard Business School, Box 2, File: Correspondence Regarding Articles and
Books, 1920-1921) (noting that the sentiments expressed in his article Judicial Review of
Administrative Findings were not orthodox).
383. Isaacs, Judicial Review, supra note 382, at 796.
384. William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870-1920, in II
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 643 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008).
385. Id.
386. See generally Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 30 YALE L.J. 776, 778 (1921)
(reviewing NAGENDRANATH GHOSE, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE ORGANIZATION AND LEGAL POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITIES IN BRITISH INDIA (1918)) (discussing constantly shifting line between when
the courts will interfere with administrators); Schiller, supra note 287, at 402.
387. Isaacs's last research assistant provides an avenue into both the studied
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Isaacs's broad contextual framework allowed him to play a
pioneering role in the development of the social-scientific study
of law and the critique of legal formalism that was the basis for
the Legal Realist Movement. Simultaneously, Isaacs endeavored
to discover universal legal principles through his cycle theory of
legal development. He attempted to resolve the tension inherent
in his jurisprudence by recognizing the provisional nature of law,
while at the same time endorsing judicial reasoning's key role in
the common law system. His conservative brand of legal realism
saw the enactment of New Deal legislation as undermining the
integrity of the common law.
The Conservative Legal Realism or realistic natural law
theory advanced by Isaacs was a blend of insights associated
with legal formalism and its antithesis-radical legal realism. In
his brand of realism, law in action was somewhere between a
body of principles and the "mass of undefinable discretion" of
radical legal realism."' Isaacs's contextualist approach to legal
reasoning allowed for the certainty of principle and the ability to
adjust principles to novel fact patterns. His scholarship assumed
that there were natural law-inspired general principles, but that
the content of that law was constantly changing. Isaacs's
conservative realism recognized the dynamic nature of law but
believed in the ability of the common law to provide a correct
answer to legal questions. Isaacs's insights on the tension
between conceptualism and realism-his belief in the efficiency
of the common law system, the need for empirical research in
order to make it more efficient, and his belief in the inefficiency
of government regulation-can be used to better understand the
role of conservative legal realism in modern legal theory.
ambiguity and the power of Isaacs's writings: The "ostensible meaning" of Isaacs's
writings "always make sense;" but that plain meaning "is often almost contradictory to
the ultimate or real meaning." Freiberg, supra note 29, at 4.
388. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 41 HARV. L. REv. 108, 111 (1927) (reviewing
HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1927)).
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